Holding Tough in Nuristan
Kip would not be surprised if 2/503 Infantry of the 173d Airborne Division holds the title of the most engaged battalion since Vietnam. Two of its companies fight hard in the Korengal and Waygal Valley in northern Kunar and southern Nuristan--another company does difficult stability operations in the Peych River valley. Several weeks ago, one of its companies suffered nine killed in action in a single engagement near Want village in Nuristan.
The loss of nine American soldiers marked the single largest loss of US troops in a firefight since 2001. It made headlines around the world as the death toll for US soldiers in Afghanistan exceeded for the second month that in Iraq (although Kip has pointed out that this is nothing new, marking a continued downward trend as a result of under-resourcing the fight there that began in 2005).
In a Stars and Stripes article, several soldiers recount the fight--one that gives the cliched use of hand-to-hand fighting real context.
After maybe two hours of intense combat, some of the soldiers’ guns seized up because they expelled so many rounds so quickly. Insurgent bullets and dozens of rocket-propelled grenades filled the air. So many RPGs were fired at the soldiers that they wondered how the insurgents had so many....
When the attack began, Stafford grabbed his M-240 machine gun off a north-facing sandbag wall and moved it to an east-facing sandbag wall. Moments later, RPGs struck the north-facing wall, knocking Stafford out of the fighting position and wounding another soldier.
Stafford thought he was on fire so he rolled around, regaining his senses. Nearby, Cpl. Gunnar Zwilling, who later died in the fight, had a stunned look on his face.
Immediately, a grenade exploded by Stafford, blowing him down to a lower terrace at the observation post and knocking his helmet off. Stafford put his helmet back on and noticed how badly he was bleeding.
Cpl. Matthew Phillips was close by, so Stafford called to him for help. Phillips was preparing to throw a grenade and shot a look at Stafford that said, "Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first."
This was only about 30 to 60 seconds into the attack.
Kneeling behind a sandbag wall, Phillips pulled the grenade pin, but just after he threw it an RPG exploded at his position. The tail of the RPG smacked Stafford’s helmet. The dust cleared. Phillips was slumped over, his chest on his knees and his hands by his side. Stafford called out to his buddy three or four times, but Phillips never answered or moved....
The insurgents then started chucking rocks at Gobble and Stafford’s fighting position, hoping that the soldiers might think the rocks were grenades, causing them to jump from the safety of their fighting hole. One rock hit a tree behind Stafford and landed directly between his legs. He braced himself for an explosion. He then realized it was a rock.
Kip recommends checking out the whole article.
Counterinsurgency may be a thinking man's war, but it remains a fighting man's war. The essence of force remains the same, described by Rupert Smith as "both the physical means of destruction--the bullet, the bayonet--and the body that applies it." A valiant and successful defense of a position against an overwhelming enemy, executed by brave Americans who have been fighting and dying for this ground for over a year.
54 comments:
That's a great article. They are nothing short of amazing. I especially love the last line.
Stafford offered a guess as to why his fellow soldiers fought so hard.
"Just hardcoreness I guess," he said. "Just guys kicking ass, basically. Just making sure that we look scary enough that you don’t want to come in and try to get us."
Brave stuff. But it fails to mention the fact that the enemy action was basically succesful, insofar as the casualty rate including wounded and dead got up to 53% (as counted by an expert over at Pat Langs.) It also seems clear to me that this assault had a bloody high degree of professionalism, the way they took out targets one by one. I wonder if this was motivated by the fact that the forces were going home? Also, does anyone know any numbers for the enemy fallen?
Hardcoreness indeed. Holy crap.
Steve Sailer asks some interesting questions about Afghanistan.
Do we have any sort of offer on the table to the Taliban (e.g., hand over Osama and Mullah Omar and change your name to something else, and we'll go home and let you locals duke it out in your time-honored manner)? Or is it our national grand strategy to be screwing around in Afghanistan until the whole place finally calms down, which will be the day after the sun explodes in 5,000,000,000 AD?
"In about five minutes, Bogar fired about 600 rounds, causing the M-249 to seize up from heat."
If you change out the box three times (or let the linked belts in the cloth roll out 600 rounds), without replacing the barrel, this might happen.
Fnord, one can't say the enemy action was "successful" or not without noting their KIAs, WIAs, MIAs, their goals and their assessment of the action.
If you don't know those salient facts, then you can't say whether the attack was a "success."
Let me again state my admiration for the brave fighters, both those who died and those who survived. My condolences to any familymember that reads this. They fought like heroes.
But, having said that: Damnit,I still dont understand the lack of high-tech gadgets. Surely the last month of any rotation with this number of contacts should be bloody brimming with loot? The whole oupost with 9 people I do not understand, how shortstaffed is this effort? Base under reconstruction + high personal friction level must almost equal a serious hit. In my opinion, whoever ordered them out there within those perimeters of possible action ought to look himself in the mirror. That was not a sound position.
snli: Crosspost, so small comment: As far as the argument went at Pat Langs, it was that there were certain parameters within conflict assessment on the state of a unit after contact, and that a percentage score over 50 declared that force for out-of-play/destroyed bcs of the need to treat the remaining forces for the experience and build them into new teams. Agreed that number of enemy casualties is a unknown factor, so its not possible to evaluate precicely. But most of the contact seems to have been a planned hit w/ sustaining fire and maneuvers, and the fact that our lads could not count the enemy dead speaks volumes for how the post-conflict enviroment might have been. They all got evaced, right?
I dont mean to be political with this, btw.
you should have a batteries of hellfires on rotational poles w/ cctv on all points, as a minimum. That would show them serious, and might just function. It would show serious. Could ge them from the Air Force, would make a hell of a co-op project.
First, Fnord, this was a very small force. To say that the equivalent of a platoon suffered about 50 percent casualties doesn't mean that the battalion it supports is ineffective.
I'm not proud to say that two units with which I served in OIF experienced 25-50 percent casualties (the first on the low end, the latter the high), and we still managed to complete the missions, such as they were.
Yes, the enemy planned an attack on a mobile patrol base of very temporary nature in OEF. But it seems as if they did not plan for the response. The patrol base wasn't overrun, and the troops managed to return sustained and sometimes accurate fire.
The S&S article posits that it was a given that the enemy were trying to overrun the patrol, but I'm not so sure. It might've seemed like they were trying to do that, but I don't know how one can say that definitively without asking some of the insurgents.
Since we don't know the goals of the enemy forces (did they intend to overwhelm the patrol and occupy the territory, or just the OP? Was it harrassing fire?) or the casualties they sustained, it's impossible to understand if they accomplished their mission.
I would suggest that the platoon seems to have been outnumbered about 4:1, and they held their position to the point that the insurgents didn't seem to make any rushes at it, except an OP, and they were pushed out of it.
I mean, it wasn't as if the platoon was in FPF and calling fire down on their own positions because the insurgents had bounded over their positions.
As for the "hardcoreness," let's demystify that a bit. The reason why the platoon could work to repulse the attack and, most likely, punish the enemy to the point that they broke contact and didn't head back, was because 1) They were well-trained and well-led, with good NCOs and platoon commander; 2) They were experienced enough in OIF and OEF to adapt and overcome, even when key weapons systems such as the small mortars were kaput; and 3) Although temporary, the patrol base was well fortified with sandbags (that likely had been prepared in advance of the movement and dumped out of the truck that took the first whack) and dug in fighting holes.
Say what you want about RPGs and 7.62mm ammo, but sandbags and fighting holes actually do a good job absorbing them. Someone made them dig in, and now the troopers know why.
It's very difficult for anyone using RPGs, AK-47s and infiltration tactics to move any force, even one outnumbered 4:1, that's well dug in and firing back with automatic weapons, even SAWs, so long as they maintain fire discipline.
Inside baseball: If the insurgents really had planned to overrun the mini-patrol base, they knew they didn't have much time. At some point, the commander or his senior NCOs declared TIC over the radio, and CAS and indirect fire support was on the way.
One reason why you don't have an accurate BDA on the enemy is because so many of them were vaporized in the CAS.
snli: Again, no disrespect to th involved forces implied. I still do not understand why such a outpost is so undermanned. They should have had 200 more.
But: "Since we don't know the goals of the enemy forces (did they intend to overwhelm the patrol and occupy the territory, or just the OP? Was it harrassing fire?)"
May I suggest that the motive was "serious payback", mobilizing all the quwam (or is that qwuam?) for a serious fing payback time? these are hillwars, mob warstheir motives are not geopolitical. It might have been a targeted hit by the new emirs of Taleban, but it might just also be a gathering of the local oldschool. It smells like that to me. I may be wrong.
i rode escort for Sgt Israel Garcia, killed in this fight.
Hundreds turned out.
He will be missed.
While this was a very small outpost, the idea- a small foco to control the surrounding area- dosnt seem, historically, to work well unless the locals only have spears.
So what was the purpose of this outpost, and does that purpose fit in a scenario of blood debt, tribal culture, and our methods of massive firepower visited on suspected targets?
Just wanted to point that the "outpost" attacked was not a FOB, simply a temporary patrol base, often established for units ranging from a squad to a platoon.
The reason it is not still occupied isn't because we gave up the ground, we have actually advanced deeper into hostile territory in that region. It was simply time to pick up and move on to continue the mission. A mission that requires our forces working in small teams to match the mobility of the enemy we are hunting.
Hi, I'm pretty new here. I have nothing against the soldiers doing their job, and I'm willing to read a lot more, but I'm entirely unclear what can be won.
I like history, so I'll include this snippet from President Cleveland's last State of the Union speech. Given in 1896, it had exactly one topic, the insurrection in Cuba, and why America should stay out of it, for now.
"American Interests in the Cuban Revolution"
"THE INSURRECTION IN CUBA still continues with all its perplexities. It is difficult to perceive that any progress has thus far been made toward the pacification of the island or that the situation of affairs as depicted in my last annual message has in the least improved. If Spain still holds Havana and the seaports and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roam at will over at least two-thirds of the inland country. If the determination of Spain to put down the insurrection seems but to strengthen with the lapse of time and is evinced by her unhesitating devotion of largely increased military and naval forces to the task, there is much reason to believe that the insurgents have gained in point of numbers and character and resources, and are none the less inflexible in their resolve not to succumb without practically securing the great objects for which they took up arms.
...
"Were the Spanish armies able to meet their antagonists in the open or in pitched battle, prompt and decisive results might be looked for and the immense superiority of the Spanish forces in numbers, discipline, and equipment could hardly fail to tell greatly to their advantage. But they are called upon to face a foe that shuns general engagements, that can choose and does choose its own ground, that, from the nature of the country, is visible or invisible at pleasure, and that fights only from ambuscade and when all the advantages of position and numbers are on its side. In a country where all that is indispensable to life in the way of food, clothing, and shelter is so easily obtainable, especially by those born and bred on the soil, it is obvious that there is hardly a limit to the time during which hostilities of this sort may be prolonged.
"Meanwhile, as in all cases of protracted civil strife, the passions of the combatants grow more and more inflamed, and excesses on both sides become more frequent and more deplorable."
Feel free to point out in any specific ways how this is irrelevant to the situation in Afghanistan. It is, in any event, an eloquent, nuanced speech by a U.S. President that clearly addresses the interests of both sides of a conflict.
fnord, are you suggesting that every COP should be manned with a reinforced company of infantry? I'm no expert, but I'm pretty sure Ramadi and Rashid and a dozen other places would still be enemy-dominated if not for platoon-size COPs...taking force protection risks is part and parcel of COIN, no?
fnord,
200 soldiers for a patrol base?
You are thinking about Vietnam style tactics. "Population-Centric COIN" requires spreading your forces down into smaller groups thus keeping a wider presence. The reason MAC-Vietnam was afraid to apply this was due to the real threat of large formations of NVA (or possibly VC) wiping out these small platoon sized forces stationed at each village. That is why they concentrated their forces.
In Iraq there is no NVA analogue. Like Tintin mentions the USMC and Army could spread out in Ramadi and Baghdad without worrying about a force of a couple hundred regulars wiping platoons out.
Afghanistan is a little more tricky with the Pakistani Boarder where large forces could assemble and cross (Like Cambodia).
I am ranting too much now. Basically 200 person patrol base? This is not the PLA.
Kip, what's a "Peych" river? Do you mean the Pech? You've spelled it right before...
Anyway, this is all very similar to the tactics -- on both sides -- of the Soviet war, right down to decent sized wave attacks on foreign outposts in Kunar/Nuristan. You'd think, considering the lessons the mujahideen taught the Soviets about the dangers of military-first approaches, that we'd have adopted a governance/civil society-first strategy by now, but we really haven't.
"executed by brave Americans who have been fighting and dying for this ground for over a year."
BRAVE???? ROFLMAO
BWHAHAHAHAHAHAHAAHAHAHA
Yeah keep convincing yourselves of the BS.
Brave lol
Brave is a few "towelheads" kicking a superpower's butt. Now THAT is BRAVE.
Not dropping two tonne bombs on weddings from 15,000 feet in the air, THAT is gutless.
"Brave is a few "towelheads" kicking a superpower's butt. Now THAT is BRAVE."
Dear stupid,
You obviously have no clue about this subject, having likely never been outnumbered four to one in a hasty patrol base, returning fire for several hours, at times reduced to foot-by-foot killing.
We like to mention "bravery," because there is some of that. But in reality there's also a great deal of training and a sense of working as a team for the good of the group, not the individual.
It's more than "bravery," and it certainly had absolutely nothing to do with dropping a bomb on a wedding.
If you can't comprehend the rudiments of what was presented to you, and couldn't fathom the sort of physical and mental courage necessary to conduct such a firefight, on both sides, then don't shame yourself further by typing idiocies that only display your incapacity to understand combat.
To the scumbucket who CLAIMS it fought in Iraq, yeah pull the other one.
You wouldn't be BRAVE enough to fight an ant let alone a "towelhead".
"You obviously have no clue about this subject, having likely never been outnumbered four to one in a hasty patrol base, returning fire for several hours, at times reduced to foot-by-foot killing."
Yeah i guess those wedding parties must have really outnumbered the "BRAVE" yanks.
The 14 year old girl in my picture must have really outnumbered you "BRAVE" yanks.
Need i list more "BRAVE" actions?
Y´all: First, sorry for the emo, but I felt a counterpoint had to be made. 53% or 45% is not a victory, its a bloody hard engagement where something went wrong. One thing I learned in industry is to be brutaly frank about danger assessment, because it actually saves lives.
My point about 200 extra goes something like this: If you want to actually play the good cop, you should start analyzing the patterns around ya. Become a migrating tribe, and shift focus of strength from one area to the other. That a new construction, in a position to recive precise MG fire, is not attended by a squad of heavies is not a good thing. There are combat multipliers, like high-tech etc. Where is the US fricking terraformers and cool robot stuff? Or for that matter, why were there no replacement-weapons for those who jammed/overheated in a nice big rack behind them?
This unit had got media-attention + weddingbombing + lots of grief + newconstructed position + notsogood tactical geo-position should call for some concern. In my book, that should have rung some bells. As you point out, snli, we dont know the CS number of deads, but from the actionreport it seems to me that the clever lads (mg and Rpg) had the timewindow pretty good.
I have no beef in this, so its not political. They fought bravely against a setpiece assault. But it shows the cost of COIN.
"It's more than "bravery," and it certainly had absolutely nothing to do with dropping a bomb on a wedding."
Tell that to the victims of those wedding partieS, yes PARTIES!
"There are combat multipliers, like high-tech etc. Where is the US fricking terraformers and cool robot stuff?"
See, now THAT'S "brave".
BWHAHAHAHAHA
Thank you for demonstrating your complete incompetence on the subject, and your general stupidity on top of it, Barbara.
That's tough to do, but you managed in swimmingly.
Perhaps you might wish to read the actual article to which Kip refers. You might notice that neither the US forces nor the Afghan insurgents were fighting against wedding parties or jousting with 2,000 lbs bombs dropped from many thousands of feet.
This was a complex attack, pitting one very small unit against the equivalent of a company or more of heavily armed insurgents.
If you can't fathom this basic concept of war, and instead want to discuss aerial bombing, then please fuck off to another thread where your incompetence in the subject might be taken more seriously.
Frankly, you're coming off as a clueless wuss, and demeaning good men in the process.
While that's probably your goal, a smarter or wittier chap could carry it off better than you did.
"at times reduced to foot-by-foot killing.""
One can figure out what you are trying to say but what a stupid way of saying it. Typical clichéd yank.
"and your general stupidity on top of it, Barbara."
Who is stupid me or the person who can't spell a name that is right in front of them????????
:)
PS: Have they gotten decent fricking chainsaws yet?
http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2008/07/04/
afghanistan-chainsaw-massacre/
"If you can't fathom this basic concept of war, and instead want to discuss aerial bombing, then please fuck off to another thread where your incompetence in the subject might be taken more seriously."
But BRAINS aerial bombing IS a "basic concept of war" for the yanks.
Of course it can't be for those "towelheads" because they have no air force.
So this is the PERFECT thread to discuss wiping out weddings from the air.
barabie: Hey, listen, Im so leftwing I am black in the political spectrum. But you are acting really stupid. Ssssssh. All revolutions begin to suceed when the army lays down its weapons in protest when ordered to fire upon their own people. this is the true secret of popular resistance as learned from the East Bloc and South America.
(feel free to delete this one too..)
""There are combat multipliers, like high-tech etc. Where is the US fricking terraformers and cool robot stuff?""
fnord, if the above is what you call left wing, then give me no wings.
"its a bloody hard engagement where something went wrong"
Because it was a bloody hard engagement something went wrong? Fnord, I've been in engagements that wiped out a good portion of my patrol. The fact that people get killed during wars and that this slaughter often is unanticipated, isn't saying much, is it?
This is why Kip prudently made the observation that COIN "may be a thinking man's war, but it remains a fighting man's war."
There are certain aspects of warfare that don't change, most especially the fact that men die in combat, and sometimes a large number of men die.
A small unit can't control its own fate. The intel might be perfect, the weather absolutely fine, the men well trained and brave, and they still might get destroyed. Sometimes there are faults, ranging from sheer incompetence to an accumulation of random mistakes that singly do nothing but as as whole became ruinous.
Oftentimes, due to the fog of war, pinning cause on the effect is hard, too.
"Who is stupid me or the person"
Oh, no. Calling you "Barbara" is intentional. It's fitting.
snli: If you are stuck in a position where you can get two accurate MG nests in your face, then you are by my book kinda screwed. Thats not a very good position. First the mortarposition, then a truck. I ackonwledge your superior knowledge, so dont want to make a screaming match out of it. But it just seems overhazardous to not have a fieldnetwork of units around, just outposts.
Me, i would have some real PRTs with forced taxes of every multi-corp n the universe to help pay it. "hey, lads, you gotta rebuild Afghan to keep on making money"!
barbie: How many Afghans do you know personally?
Seeing as you both are so childishly preoccupied with my name, i may as well give you a LITTLE hint.
My nic actually contains a clue which you morons have obviously missed as you are so concerned with plastic dolls.
Btw, one has got to love the fact two armchair generals are discussing "strategy" (roflmao) about war.
BWHAHAHAHAHAHAHA
Thanks for the entertainment, clowns.
"barbie: How many Afghans do you know personally?'
Probably nowhere near as many as your mom.
"two armchair generals "
Uhhhh, I didn't know my combat experience came from an armchair. My rank, terminal, is far below that of a general, too.
One might notice that I seem to know intimately how such firefights are conducted, by whom, and the likely results of them. This would seem fairly obvious to everyone, so you must continue to display incompetence (soaked in venom) on the subjet.
Bully for you.
I've given you the well-deserved nickname of "Barbara" -- and not the girl's toy -- in homage to Barbara Bush. Enjoy your conjugal visits with George, because you most certainly have earned them.
Fnord, the loss of the mortar position obviously was a tactical goal of the Afghan insurgents. It appears to have been the first position hit by aimed RPG fire, then the tow truck (they probably mistook that for something more important, or to take out its top mount, which likely was a M-2 .50 cal or MK-19, if it was even there).
A tow truck in and of itself is of little tactical value, being a support vehicle and not necessarily a crucial one. I figure it was mostly used to transport the sandbags for the very small outpost and to tug out their patrol vehicles when they get stuck in muck, adverse terrain or tear up their axles.
It probably was hit because they thought it was used as an ad hoc CP. Perhaps there was an antenna sticking out. Perhaps it was just the largest target out there, got hit a lot by RPGs due to its size and proximity to other targets, and those experiencing the attack assumed it was the next (intentional) target of the insurgents.
Again, fog of war.
The decision to attack the OP also wasn't exactly unexpected, because the OP likely will be the least defended part of the defense system, and the occupants pulled back at the first sign of trouble. It seems to have been held by a bit less than a squad, and likely guarded a forward position that needed to cover a depression or otherwise hard-to-hit area.
In other words, there was nothing unusual about how the attack rolled out, nor how the defenders protected the small patrol base and repulsed the assault, for the reasons I've already laid out.
The only thing that seems striking to me about this attack was the mortality count for the US force. Had the casualties been WIA, I don't know if we'd be talking about it.
Emblematic of these two wars have been the very high WIA rates, and the low KIAs. There are many reasons for this, but we can't forget the the far better field medical care and reduced transport times to trauma wards, the better body and vehicular armor and the nearly universal Combat Lifesaver training given to US personnel designed to immediately treat wounds.
That said, there always will be the run of probabilities in any firefight, and deaths due to SAF, rockets, et al, can accumulate quickly.
"It probably was hit because they thought it was used as an ad hoc CP. Perhaps there was an antenna sticking out."
sir, we agree. to be a bastard, the hezbollah lesson to the red oppos seems to be to take out the com. poition at all costs. Wich I would agree with, if it was me. then our lads are naked.
The problem for the enemy, Fnord, is that the SUL at that patrol base likely has five or six similar radios in the vehicles alone (often configurations of more than one array), not to mention supplementary communication assets like BFT.
In other words, hitting one radio won't knock out com. I should add that this is a radical change from Desert Storm, where a platoon like mine likely had only a couple of radios and they were the PRC-77s.
In the open desert, they were OK, but they never had the range of later versions now standard in the force. An attack, say, 15 years ago on a light, mobile patrol base like the one recently assaulted in Afghanistan might have more readily cut com (actually, the PRC's bad range would've meant the patrol was out of com anyway), but today it would be nearly impossible due to the multiplication of radios, the use of BFT and even expedients like sat-phones given to commanders and their NCOs.
snli: Within opsec, I used to be very cyberpunk, I know some low-tech answers to that challenge, without detailing. Do not ever be assured of your ability to keep ahead of the streets. At some point, counter-sec will arrive, and thats a nature of Law.
Oh, btw: The Merkava tanks were not so functional after all were they? They had reloading functions in the back?
They are still brave lads.
Barbarie,
Why is it I am nearly certain you write your bile, hatred and jahil ghaba stupidity from the safety of a Western Country?
I have cleaned and washed Arab children's feet and dressed their wounds (I didn't have to, we didn't f*ck them up, they stepped on something while barefoot). I doubt you have. Or Afghan kids either.
As much as I hate the enemy, as much as I have much reason to hate the enemy, I don't go to their web sites and defame their mothers, or their dead. Some things you don't do.
Go find the enemy's websites, or your left wing rabid moonbat sites, and leave us alone.
Joshua Foust,
Peych, Pech, Pesh...seen them all on maps. In Dari, it's pretty straight forward...stupid latin letters.
Fnord, you don't merit deletion, and I'm too tired to delete those who do.
Kip
“…one can't say the enemy action was "successful" or not without noting their KIAs, WIAs, MIAs, their goals and their assessment of the action.”
Sure, if you want to be academic about it. But in practical terms, those data points are irrelevant. If we perceive their attack to be successful, then it was successful. We are their enemy, if we think they got one over on us, then it doesn’t matter whether they achieved their goals, what the results of their assessments are, or what their casualty rate was. They may think their attack was a total failure, but there’s something to be said for influencing your opponent’s perceptions and will.
". If we perceive their attack to be successful, then it was successful. "
Who is this "we?" Is it you? It's certainly not me. A platoon outnumbered 4:1 that defends itself quite capably against an insurgent attack, to the point that the Talibi irregulars break contact and flee across the border? That doesn't seem like much of a loss to me.
It's one platoon, out of thousands of platoons deployed for combat as we speak. Platoons are bloodied every day, although usually we're talking WIAs and not KIAs.
Is the "K" the difference? If so, then you're dealing with permutations, random signals in the ether that add up sometimes to a sentence, other times to a comma.
There are quite a few platoons spread out across the large landmass of Afghanistan. Many are in relatively isolated areas, hard up on the border of Pakistan. Just as there are many units, irregular as they are, across the Pakistani border (such as it is) in the lawless NW territories. Should the US destroy one of those platoon-sized elements, I'm not sure anyone would be dancing in the war room that peace was at hand.
What betrays just how uninsightful the comment was -- "academic about it" -- is that the supposed "academic" assessment of combat is alien to the enemy. It isn't.
He has only so many men, only so much time, only so much materiel, only so much funding, only so much support, only so many LOCs to feed him, only so many objectives to hit, only so many hits he can manage and survive as a fighting force, only so many goals to accomplish with the forces he can muster.
Is adverse western public opinion enough? Probably not. Certainly not worth so much as the wholesale destruction of his combat force, which might have happened.
Rather than traffic in conjectural declarations, as if everything is certain, I'm a bit more cautious. We simply don't know what the enemy achieved in his balancing scale of decision-making.
I'm a bit bemused to see so many convinced one way or the other about a single platoon's actions. I verily doubt that many in platoon have a tangible idea about even what happened (see my discussion above), much less whether they "achieved" anything in the melee.
And that might be the very bedrock fact of combat, especially small unit actions. All is fog, all friction, all loss.
This is normal. I imagine the same fuzziness bedevils the enemies on the other side of the mountain.
I still pose the question. How can this notion of the infantry lads traveling light, taking on the "enemy"- a variety of forces, with several different motivations, but all determined to rid the area of foriegn , alien soldiers work? Yes, I know, one on one, building bridges....I have very little doubt our fellows can do this.
But for the fact that this is a culture- or many cultures- that hold the basic tenet of the blood debt. and its tribal. And the USAF drops very large bombs on "suspected' enemy targets, killing large numbers of people minding thier own business, which prompts thier families &tribes to seek payment FOR THEIR DEATHS. IN BLOOD.
All the academic jargon & acronyms in the world cant overcome that fundimental fact. So, our infantry pays the price for air power & artillery. And a criminal level of political mis-leadership.
its too late to "win" in Afghanistan. The only question is how many more Afghani's are we gonna kill & maim before we face that fact. Its been blown. Its over. Our POLITICAL LEADERSHIP wrecked any chance we had before we started. Going back to when we walked away from the place & left it in the hands of lunatic warlords when the Sovs pulled out. Guys so bad they made the Taliban look good to the peasantry.
or am I missing something?
I guess we can "win" the same way we could have "won" in Viet Nam: Kill EVERYBODY who wouldnt sell out their country to foriegn occupiers.
Is that the plan?
SNLII,
Good points and I don’t disagree, largely. What I was trying to get at with my "unsightful" comment is the thought that “success” can be a product of one’s perceptions, not just an exercise in number crunching. U.S. commentators—including participants in this thread—have described the attack as a “surprise” and as “successful.” While I agree with you that we can never really know if the attack was objectively a success until we take into account the factors that you pointed to —and I agree that it was very costly for the insurgents with nothing much to show for it—for some reason I kept thinking about parallels with other “successes” that were perceived as such by one belligerent even though the action may not have been an objective success at all. Akin, for example, to the Israel-Hezbollah unpleasantness in 2006, TF Ranger in Somalia, or the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. In all of these cases, didn’t the strategic victory go to forces that got an ass-whoopin’? That’s what I was trying to get at (granted, this action is not in par, strategically speaking, with those examples, but it’s the idea I was trying to nail down).
Mutt,
Thanks for riding escort. Do realize that if we do not fight the "far" enemy, we will fight the "near" one.
Which means race riots, or worse. Not with another 30 brigades could you stop what will be happening on both sides of the Hudson if we have another day like that.
I am not saying it's right, I'm saying it will happen.
Winning in Afghanistan, or Iraq, or anywhere else is defined as: the homeland is safe.
Jeez, Elf- you really need to turn off hannity & those radio clowns.
Blowing up swaths of other peoples countries in no way, shape or form makes the homeland "safer".
Go out side, get some fresh air.
This is a murderous debacle of our own making. We cant bomb our way out of it, the people who got us IN to it, & set the parameters by which we conduct our operations consider power, wealth, & face. The good of this country in the short OR long haul figures not at all.
This is one ongoing criminal debacle we will be paying for in blood & treasure for a generation, More of the same isnt the answer.
Fight them there so we dont have to fight them here. What rubbish. They do have maps, you know.
jeez.
OK Mutt, if you say so.
I don't believe Hannity is saying what I said.
Peace out
BTW, it's not my blog, but A.M may want to think of turning off the Anon's.
It's not a free speech issue, it's the "worlds of warcraft" spamming, which of course link to virus's.
Just a thought, on the admin side. The other Anon the other day amounted to a DOS attack.
Peace out
"tow truck" = vehicle with a TOW.
"undermanned" - these guys are paratroopers. they got air assaulted into places like this all the time, sometimes just squad-sized elements. They have until nightfall to dig in with whatever got dropped in from the helos. This is what they do.
"whoever ordered them out there... not a sound position." - see above. this brigade had over 9000 TICs dúring this deployment. please.
"replacement-weapons in a nice big rack behind them" - this is not the shooting range. especially after you get blown out of your position.
"Sometimes there are faults... that singly do nothing but as as whole became ruinous." - best comment in the thread. thanks, snlii.
RIP, guys.
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