Al-Qaeda - history and future

Londonstani is struggling to decide whether he really likes this long article on al-Qaeda by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank in the Independent (which was originally printed in The New Republic).

The pondering has already gone on over a cup of tea and two marmalade toast and instead of coming nearer to a conclusion, Londonstani has just come up with new points to put in his "pro" and "con" columns.

One of the things that really gets up Londonstani's journalistic nose is a media tendency to indulge in what he calls "snapshot explanation". This is where a quick look at any given situation is afforded miles of tortured explanation - manipulating historic events to show how they could never have led to any other conclusion except the one encapsulated by the snapshot in question. A good example resides in the lakes of ink wasted by British newspapers writing long-winded explanations of Obama's political triumph and revolutionary methods just before Hillary's win at the New Hampshire primary in January. Really, it was rather amusing to see the papers have to talk up Hillary's win to justify their premature exaltations. Londonstani boycotted comment and analysis for a whole week after that.

This article seems to fall into the same bracket. And looks like it's behind the curve at the same time. Yes, AQ looks like its suffering in Iraq. AQ or AQ-inspired attacks in the UK have been foiled and their perpetrators put on trial. While the group hasn't put on a major attack elsewhere for quite a while. A few people - officials and analysts - have been saying that the downturn in the group's fortunes is due to fatigue amongst its intended audience - Sunni Muslims - for its hyper violent methods.

Now, this might be the case but it is at very best an extrapolation from what we see around us and not a fact. It doesn't take into account what's happening on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, whether the group is shifting tactics, evolving or changing focus. At least one new development that makes Londonstani think it's too soon to consign AQ to history are new reports that suggest its ideas and rhetoric are spreading to a new "self radicalising" audience in the West.

The writers also take as fact information released by the Egyptian authorities that Sayyid Imam el Sherif "recanted" his violent ideology in jail. Sherif - a former mentor of Ayman al Zawahiri - was jailed by Yemen shortly after 9/11 and then shipped to Egypt. The Egyptians said they convinced him to write a book recounting his views and trumpeted the result as an achievement of their type of "deradicalisation". In fact, Sherif had fallen out before 9/11 with the men that went on to found AQ over the use of violence. Londonstani was also told by a very good source in London that Sherif had published a book in Arabic in the late 1990s in London which laid out his position and was basically the same as the book the Egyptians said proved their persuasive powers a decade later.

However, having said all that; in Londonstani's view, this article's real contribution is its explanation of the conflicting currents in the jihadi world. And its suggestion that Western support for brutal regimes in the Arab world is a key motivating factor for AQ's stance.

In the post 9/11 world, regimes like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen etc have climbed onto the terror band wagon and made common cause with Western governments by presenting terrorism as a common enemy. Western officials have been convinced that a little blind eye turning when it comes to human rights abuses is worth it if it keeps AQ types from assuming power in a major, or even minor, Arab state.

But Londonstani can't help wondering if a little historical perspective - as provided by this article - wouldn't contribute greatly to the discussion. Reading between the lines, it suggests that the men who thought it was justified to fight their oppressive governments were marginalised by those who decided the conflict needed to be escalated by attacking those who supported their governments.

In Londonstani's experience, the "swamp" of support that AQ types draw on is reduced when the US is seen to be pressuring its Arab allies to hold free elections, free political prisoners, free the press and repeal emergency laws.

When Western officials suggest that they will not let terrorists dictate foreign policy, they are thinking about Israel. But their policies have already been affected by terrorists. Our governments now offer more diplomatic and material help to abusive regimes than before 9/11, and this plays to AQ's message and contributes to our problem.