Fighting Continues in Lebanon; Policy Options for the U.S.? (Updated)
Nir Rosen sent along this description of what it was like to patrol on the streets of Hamra with Hizbollah following their victory in West Beirut: "It felt just like being on patrol with young American soldiers in Dora in December. They operated that well, moved that well, and were as young as American soldiers on their first tour."
Meanwhile, fighting continues in the mountains east and south of Beirut. There are reports of heavy fighting near Tripoli as well. Overall, the March 14th forces have been taking one hell of a beating. Abu Muqawama has been searching for comment on the fighting from some of March 14th's strongest supporters in Washington, and he accordingly read David Schenker's piece for the Washington Institute. David has been a resolute supporter of March 14th, but he is intellectually honest, and his assessment of U.S. policy options seems, to this blogger, quite accurate:
Regardless of what drove the timing of the standoff, it appears the government miscalculated. Sadly, for Washington, there are few realistic policy options to reverse the Hizballah coup. It is highly unlikely that the UN -- which failed to even prevent the rearming of Hizballah -- would agree to more dangerous deployments in Lebanon.David then pins his hopes on the Lebanese Army, but it seems to Abu Muqawama that, if anything, the Lebanese Army has sided with Hizbollah in the fighting. That is to say, they can obviously see Hizbollah is the strongest side and they've basically stayed out of it, happy to act as peace-keepers once the fighting has already reached some sort of conclusion but unwilling to step in between the two sides. Does this square with what everyone else is thinking, or no?
If you want to read stuff from hard-core March 14th supporters, check out Michael Totten's blog where Michael, Lee Smith, and Tony Badran (and David Wurmser) have all been blogging on the situation in Lebanon and policy options there. Oddly, Lee -- who Abu Muqawama likes very much and met in Lebanon, in 2005 -- seems more worked up right now over whether or not Obama might be less pro-March 14th than President Bush and not paying all that much attention to the fighting in Lebanon that might be making it more and more difficult to ... support March 14th.
But maybe this blogger is wrong. After all, it's not as if the U.S. government is going to suddenly switch horses and become pro-Hizbollah, right? So the question for the readership is: Given the events of the past week, what should America's policy be toward Lebanon? Should it change? And if so, how?
(Abu Muqawama is genuinely stumped here, so all answers are welcome.)
Update: Watch the BBC get shot at in what Abu Muqawama is guessing is the Chouf.
Update II: Read/Listen to Nick Blanford's report for the Christian Science Monitor. His article in the London Times today suggested he had been on the phone talking with Walid Bey at some point, though Abu Muqawama is guessing he has been reporting from behind Hizbollah's "lines." Stay safe, Nick!
Update III: Borzou Daragahi -- who used to write wonderful reports from Iraq for the Los Angeles Times -- has an article today from Beirut talking about American-led efforts to create a Sunni militia in Lebanon. What a militia that was! How much money did the U.S. spend to create a militia who threw down their weapons and ran when Hizbollah invaded their neighborhoods?
Update IV: At least Jumblatt's Druze fought in the Chouf. Reuters is reporting 14 Hizbollah militiamen were killed. Wasn't it Jumblatt who was always saying "The war of the mountain is finished" with respect to the war between the Maronites and Druze following the Israeli withdrawal in the 1980s? Well, I guess Round II is finished now too. Seriously, though, studies have shown the Lebanese militias always fought best when on their home turf, and though this one will go in the "L" column for the PSP, at least they put up a better fight than Sheikh Saad's Hamra All-Stars.
49 comments:
Hezbollah is 3-0.
I didn't like Schenker's piece. It lacked objectivity. The narrative was predictable- Hezbollah is the bad guy, etc etc.
People criticize Rosen for having an open mind- and understanding Arabic.
What should America do? The question should be rephrased: What can America do with the Israel lobby calling the shots for ME foreign policy? Realistically, it can be expected to pursue the same course- deny the Shia what is justly theirs by means of Lebanon's demographics.
Cruising around the Lebanese Party message boards there are reports that PSP has killed quite a few Hizb in the mountains South East of Beirut.
If this is true it sounds like Hizb. is not necessarily cake walking into some areas and has lost some men.
About what US Policy should be?
I'd say let things take their course and see what happens. Push the narrative that M14-Hariri and Co. rebuilt Lebanon while Hizb. just started more wars that wrecked the country. Hizb offers nothing to the non-Shia except anxiety.
If we end up with GMA as prez and he implements that disastrous economic policy he will end up discrediting himself. FPM people remind me of Obama supporters in the US, they want Hope and Change but don't really have a plan to do much better.
The administrations response to events in the last week is one of the biggest topics of discussion in Beirut right now. Both sides are shocked at how muted the response has been. Maybe its just the shock of a new parent, who identified the pain of '06 as just the "birth pangs of the new Middle East" only to find that the child borne is obviously not the result of a union that involved said parent.
But US policy options for Lebanon are going to be dictated by agenda. Does the US simply want to see a sovreign, democratic, free and strong Lebanon, able to both stand for itself and defend itself against attack from either the East or South?
If it did, the options would be easy. Allowing the military to be armed well enough to take on the job of defense would nullify Hizballahs claims as defenders of the country and their demand to keep their weapons. This would in turn lessen both Irans and to a lesser extent Syrias influence on the country and would allow the non-Shia population threatened by Hizballahs weapons to breathe easier.
Unfortunately, all evidence points to the fact that the US, or at least this administration will not allow that to happen. Firstly, it would be vetoed by Israel and secondly it would lessen the need for Lebanon,or certain factions in Lebanon, to come and bow at the altar.
Nevertheless, the US has a good opportunity here. It can, to use bech's favorite term, engage. It can talk to those it could not concievably talk to before because, as the Israelis love saying, the facts on the ground have changed.
But it won't happen, not with this administration anyway. They will continue to back a losing horse and rely on black ops, subterfuge and shennanigans hoping one of them pays off, not learning that on the ground Hizballah holds all the cards. This is the path of least resistance as those it will work with have a visceral hate of Hizballah and are easy to motivate into action. Unfortunately, the path of least resistance is very rarely the path to the most gain.
What cards does Hizballah hold? They have 40% (by most estimates) of the population by default, therefore only requiring another 10.1% to claim the democratic high ground. They have shown that no one is going to touch them militarily so they and their weapons are going nowhere. Their intelligence network has, considering the number of agencies working against it, managed to keep things impressively tight.
But lets face it, Hamas, Sadr, Hizballah; the names change but the policy stays the same.
AM,
Naharnet reports the USS Cole is heading back to "the Mediterranean." Whats the plan? What good does it do?
Also, any thoughts on what Petraeus might want to do?
Nir Rosen is embedded with Hezbollah?
Yes except that I am on Hamra today and I woked up next to Verdun for a nice falafel then back down to AUB Sea gate, people are out in the sun, most of the shops are open, circulation of cars is kind of lower in intensity because some shops are closed and schools are closed.
Will soon post something on my blog answering the topics we raised. Hope you're well ya abu muqawama
sorry meant I "walked up to".
by the way, I still don't see your policy recommendations
oups forgot to say that there was not one single armed person on the street.
the only thing you can find that is kind of funny is that the SSNP had left its logos all over the place, on walls, flags here and there, etc.
It seems to me that Washington's only policy option at the moment is to stay quiet --any high-profile moves only serve to bolster Hizbullah's narrative that the current fighting has been about foiling a US-Israeli plot against the weapons of the resistance, and undercut M14's narrative that this is all about the weapons of the "resistance" being turned against fellow Lebanese.
To be frank, Mo, I doubt that arming the Lebanese Army would really undercut Hizbullah's desire to retain its weapons. Moreover, on its current fiscal base, Lebanon couldn't afford to main an army of the sort that would be required to be any significant deterrent to the IDF. (I don't think Hizbullah actually deters Israel either, but that's a previous discussion.)
Resolving the Shaba Farms dispute would be more helpful, I think, in undercutting Hizbullah's claim to maintaining its status as a non-state armed group. However, it is difficult to see the Israelis cooperating if the process looks anything like a Hizbullah victory, and if there were no assurances that Hizbullah would substantially disarm.
Engage Hizbullah? There is no way this administration will even contemplate that, of course. Another administration might--however, Hizbullah would have to find some way of signaling that it won't suddenly return to 2006-type adventurism. I've long argued that policy makers need to face up to the 40% fact that Mo points to--it is not an argument that gets much traction, however.
An alternative possibility is to try to pull Aoun away from the M8 alliance by pushing M14 to give him a major role. Whether the FPM would want to walk away from its alliance with Hizbullah and Syria is an open question, as is whether Jumayil, the LF, etc, would ever consider allowing the FPM a real share of political power. However, at its core the FPM is as virulently anti-Hizbullah as any M8 supporter is, seeing the "weapons of the resistance" as a fundamental threat to the sovereignty and security of Lebanon. (This, of course, is why Hizbullah never genuinely pushed him as a presidential candidate.) Moreover, it would help Aoun limit the damage that recent events have done to him in the Christian communities.
A final possibility, sadly, is that Washington does what it is accused of doing (but, to this point, really hasn't on a substantial scale): gives a green light for the full-scale arming of Hizbullah's rivals, with the actual arming and financing being done by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan. I don't think anyone would harbour any fantasies about this posing a serious military threat to Hizbullah, but it would allow external actors to suck Hizbullah into a series of debilitating confrontations (and, in so doing, contribute to a polarizing sectarianism that made it increasingly difficult for the party to maintain any semblance of a cross-sectarian national coalition).
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On a separate issue, everyone should be paying very close attention to what happens in the Chouf. Not only is there significant risk of things spiraling out of control there, but it is also the logical political and geographic location for Hizbullah to apply additional military pressure if their West Beirut operation fails to produce the desired political dividends.
anon 12:50: Very well put. Im still wondering how much of the recent fighting was aimed at such Saudi-backed groups and how much was oriented against traditional Lebanese militias. Have the Druze been challenged seriously, does anyone know? (Ive been out of the loop for the weekend, so am woefully under-infoed.) The question to me is wether this is a serious push for a reconfiguration of the Lebanese political demonstration or a power-demo/cleaning-up exercise.
As for US policy options, again, somehow you need to find a player to fill the honest-broker role the US once upon a time used to pretend to have. The current US administration is seen as a Israeli tool, and so anything positive they might bring to the table will automatically be seen as another attempt to stab the other players in the back. See, this is what you get from declaring existential conflict with everybody who does not agree with you. I would like to direct y`all over to Pat Langs site Sic Semper Tyrannis for some thoughts as well.
rb,
No offence if you are Lebanese but you are looking at things from the wrong angle, i.e the non-Lebanese one.
Fiscaly, many of M14's allies tried to arm the military for free as a way of undercutting the legitimacy of Hizballahs arms. However most deals were vetoed or altered (such as the modifications to the helicopter gunships that came from Qatar) by the US. This simply proved to many people that the US would never allow the Lebanese military to be anything more than it is.
Arming the military may not cut their desire to retain weapons (irrespective of their statements of being willing to disarm if the army could replace it). What it does is undercut the legitimacy of the weapons. Whether or not one believes them to be a deterent, given the choice im sure any potential invader would rather there was no resistance, no army than one or the other.
Resolving Shebaa would be more helpful in bolstering the M14 than undercutting the resistance to be honest. Even if Shebaa were given back, supporters of the resistance would ask whats to stop the Israelis just taking it back once the resistance is disarmed.
I think the 2006 adventurism is over for a long while. I think in fact that psychologicaly they know Israel is itching to try again and they are probably enjoying not giving them the excuse, to the extent that they have put off the retaliation for Mughniyehs assasinations.
With Aoun anything is possible, but he has declared the strength of the alliance so often that they would have to bait with a pretty Presidential carrot for him to take that kind of hit on his credibility.
I disagree with you in regards to whether or not M14 has been arming and training fighters but if you are right and it hasn't I doubt its going to happen now.
I think all the comments here can be summarized in one statement: "What US Policy?" I don't think there exists any substantial, long-term oriented strategy in which the US govt plays a prominent role. The Bush administration's failure to articulate and champion a policy that balances Israeli security concerns with the goal of stablizing Arab nations is the culpret here.
I presume Wurmser's advice involves dropping a bomb somewhere? Just guessing.
The SSNP involvement is interesting; as is that of Amal, and I even saw a reference to the Mourabitoun somewhere. Amal and even Communist militiamen were unexpectedly important in 2006; is there a relative resurgence of the Left, or is someone trying to put on same?
Okay, the Times answered my Druse-question: "Supporters of the Druse leader, Walid Jumblatt, who is allied with the government, and Hezbollah gunmen and their Druse allies exchanged machine gun fire and rockets in several villages, a day after Hezbollah accused Mr. Jumblatt’s followers of killing two of its members and kidnapping a third. There was no word on casualties."
Anyone know the background of the Druse split? Because a Druse on Druse conflict is not going to go away easily, from what little I know of that cultural group. Anyone have a link to any nifty maps that show wich territories each group controls/controlled in Lebanon? Or a table of all the players, at least?
fnord, not really a split. The pro-opposition Druze is mainly a party led by Talal Arslan and is the only serious rival to Jumblat (although serious is a relative term. They have about 8-9% of support in the Druze community to Jumblats 85-90% odd). The party is only about 7 years old and has only won one or 2 seats in its time.
alex, its not a proper civil war in Lebanon if the ssnp arent involved. They are like that duckling Jerry used to have to protect from Tom. Crop up once in a while and causes its ally all sorts of problems without being fantastcaly useful.
Amal are shia who cant take the discipline of being in Hizballah but want to carry a gun.
And Mourabitoun?!! haven't seen them and the SSNP in the same sentence since 1985.
Mo: To get perspective here, how many actual persons are we talking about in the Druze factions? And more importantly, how many fighters? Are these divisions based on clan/family or is it a even split across the Druze population? (I find the Druze highly fascinating. Pass me the Golden Peacock gin...)
The Mourabitoun! Let's bring those yahoos back!
fnord,
Hard numbers are hard to come by since thee hasnt been a census in Lebanon for so long but its estimated that the Druze are about 300,000-400, 000 strong. Numbers of fighters, well your guess is as good as mine but as a percentage of the population, considering their history of being a minority and often persecuted, it is likely to be higher than the average.
The Druze in Lebanon have always been led by 2 families, the Jumbalts and the Yazbaks (whom confusingly Talal Arslan heads). Prior to about 1987 the power and support was quite equal but a series of bad mistakes and set backs by the Yazbak clan led to the ascendancy of the Jumbalts. In the intervening years, jumblats power base, and influence have grown significantly at the expense of the others, due to his remarkable abilty to change his colours overnight and somehow always end up siding with the winner of any conflict.
But with the loses he is incuring today (never has the PSP been defeated in the mountains before) and the vitriol aimed at him by Nasrallah last week, people are wondering about his future (and according to local sources after what Nasrallh called him, he believed for a while that he was a dead man).
fnord,
something you need to understand about the druze of the chouf, and the lebanese factions in general, is that numbers are misleading (unless we are talking swiss bank accounts). It is true that Jumblatt commands authority and that his current position is rather unassailable. However, many druze who support Jumblatt hate his guts and would agree even in with Nasrallah that he is both a thief and a liar (but only in private). That being said, if they feel their community is under seige (more psychological than real) they will rally around him.
Of course, the governing dynamic is money, who has it and who wants it. And Jumblatt is very, very good at bilking his patrons and keeping his clients somewhat satisfied. This is the story of druze politics, not whatever horseshit comes out Walid's mouth. Describing him or anyone else in Lebanon as pro this or anti that is ridiculous beyond compare. The only party in Lebanon that is maintained through some semblance of ideological glue is HA and they are also probably the 'cleanest' party in Lebanon. This cleanliness was subsidized by Iran, of course. The big question is will HA continue its hygienic practices as it becomes more and more embedded in the mud of lebanese politics. I am doubtful, but we shall see.
Mo,
Love that line about Amal. Perfect. As for the SSNP, well that goes to my above comment. They maintain a presence in some areas and are useful because of their enemies, who are also the enemies of HA.
AM,
I dig your blog and your style, but would be afraid to meet you in person, because if you said you 'met me and liked me a lot,' I would harbor suspicions that you think I am a complete jackass (its true, i will admit). And so speaking of barn animals, do we really need to read M. Totten and Lee Smith? Smith, of course, brings us Wurmser to explain the 2008 lebanese crisis, just as he dined with sharansky to explain the 2006 war. As for Totten, well, pulse of freedom and all that. Badran is a different animal, because he is intelligent and knows quite a bit about Lebanon (this distinguishes him from both Smith and Totten). I disagree with him wholeheartedly, but respect his opinion in a grudging way. Moreover, it is incorrect, but telling to call them 'hard core' m14 supporters. There is no M14 -- anti-syrian barking is not a policy or a political alliance. It is a marketing campaign (or information operation, if you prefer) and thus has room for people like Totten and Smith and Now Lebanon, and Eli Khoury, and the Lebanese Renaissance Foundation, et al. Just look at any pic that includes Geagea and Jumblatt and tell me what they stand for and I will try to not giggle.
In addition, the LA times piece overreaches, just as Hersh did. There is something there, but the illogic of Lebanon's ruling coaltion makes a real fighting force impossible. They don't trust each other. Same could be said for the opposition, but here we need to know more about the non-HA elements fighting during the 2006 war. Are these alliances stable and disciplined, probably not (the burning of FTV suggests no), but many of the most hardened and blood thirsty and blood stained in Lebanon and Syria are in the thrall of HA and Nasrallah on a personal level. I would suspect that I dont need to tell you the value of respect in combat or crisis.
Also, did you see the number of comments for Lebanon posts? And you wonder why the country is so fucked up?
rb,
you make good points and I think your analysis explains why things are the way they are and why they will remain so -- no 'new' era as Nasrallah said. In the long run, it depends on the US-Iran showdown, I think.
anon,
Dont know which above comment you mean as you've posted as anon.
But, why respect Badran? electoral reform, an end to the current corrupt patronage system, and the development of the economy that provides for a fair distribution of services, opportunities and employment apparently isnt the problem in Lebanon? Its Hizballah? Im guessing Mr Badran must do quite well from the current patronage system if he doesnt think its a problem.
As for AM, you'll find he has a soft spot for Lebanon based right wing Europeans reporting from Lebanon....
Its amazing that whatever blog you visit,AM, Pat Langs, if Lebanon is the topic the posts are always 50% higher (partially my fault on this one)
I think the key here is that Lebanon isn't really a democracy, but a consociate; it only appears to have functioning democratic institutions when the partners - the leaders of Lebanon's sects - of the consociate are in near agreement. And aside from Hezbollah, the mostly-unelected leaders of Lebanon's sectarian factions, like mob leaders throughout history, take their cues from the most vocal and strident constituents.
Thus, although Hezbollah has violated the rules, the response from the government is not immediate. At this stage, perhaps nobody knows what that response will be. And no one knows what effect it may have.
anon: Very interesting post. Concerning Lebanon, I have no illusions about the merits concerning cash vs. loyalty among the "western alliance". Maybe that is why hez is functioning a wee bit better? From the fighting reports, the recent actions sound like men vs. boys, veterans vs. greens. (And do we know wich militia burned the TV station, btw?) This could also be seen as a soft realfire exercise to integrate the Amal militia into the Hez commandstructure, btw. Lots of utilities militarily with an op like this, great training.
Thats a "force multiplier" wich is rarely mentioned btw, that of (relative) honesty & honour when facing obviously corrupt resistance. Wich is, as always, an underestimated moving force in at least the muslim societies I have been in contact with.
@ Bech: The reason why the SSNP stuff is still up everywhere is because even if they're not in the street, they're still there. Their offices are there, and many of them live there. If you don't believe go down to t-marbuta and see if you don't see a couple of the gunmen.
Everyone I know in Hamra would love nothing more than to tear those Nazi flags down and spit on them, but they know they'll be attacked if they do.
And while Hamra may be quiet, in the last 24 hours, dozens of people have died in the Chouf and the North.
And in case you haven't seen it, check out the SSNP statement that threatens Hariri with assassination.
Mo--I'm not Lebanese, and the question AM was set was "Policy options for the US." There is, of course, no "Lebanese" perspective, but many--which is much of the problem. (Click my name for something that makes the point far better than I could--I'm sure you've seen it before).
I'm not sure where you're disagreeing with me--I was simply noting that a better armed Lebanese military still wouldn't be much of a deterrent to Israel. (The only area where it might be were it to acquire and deploy a capable SAM system, and yes the Israelis would protest and press the US to block it.) Since no one in official Washington believes that a better armed Lebanese Army would actually significantly impact Hizbullah's desire and ability to retain arms--and are also well aware of the influence Hizbullah has in the military--they're not likely to go beyond the kinds of material they've already been supplying.
I don't make American policy--I'm only describing it.
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On a different note, I would love to know what the Iranians think of all this--they've consistently been much more cautious than Nasrallah, nudging Hizbullah in the direction of being more conciliatory.
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And finally, yes Jumblat is running scared--he fears he's both a personal target, and that Hizbullah and its allies will ratchet up the pressure by overrunning large parts of the Chouf. Although his fighters are better motivated, they are much less better trained and equipped.
Ya Mo,
I agree, but I am not pushing for Nasrallah's beatification now or in the future.
As for respect for Badran. I dont know him personally and am not interested in attacking or praising his personal choices or motivations, but rather his ideas and analyses. And it seems to me that he represents a certain current in Lebanese politics that must have a seat at the table. He is decidedly not FL, but I also felt it was a huge mistake to ban the FL after Taif (in an ideal world, Geagea would be behind bars for three or four lifetimes, but also in that world, HA would publicly criticize the behavior of Syrian regime elements in Lebanon). But we dont live in that world. Do we?
I would say that Badran's value is in poking holes in some of the more idiotic and patently false myths of Arab nationalism. The Syrian regime deserves to be pilloried and I dont see HA doing it, so someone with the inclination must (again I am saying this because I think Badran represents imperfectly certain political currents or sentiments in Lebanon).
My point is that consensus is the solution and consensus only holds where every party feels that have a stake in that decision-making process. Terminal emnity is not, and has never been, a bar to coexistence among Lebanon's political players.
fnord,
Those are interesting and open questions. One reason for HA's success in the resistance business is that they kept to themselves (ie the PLO's alliances were their downfall because they could be so easily infiltrated by Israel, the US, Syria, et al.) Coordination between Amal and the SSNP and HA will be interesting to watch. Also, it is important to note that it seems that it is not HA fighters who have been participating, but rather a different corps (perhaps the more beirut, more political wing of reservists who are engaged in what might be called police actions -- pure speculation here, but they are identifying themselves as HA, so that is worth noting). Does HA trust Berri? I don't know, but know that I would not. It seems like they do, but this is Lebanon after all and trust is for the weak.
rb,
Should have been more specific, sorry. When I mean by the Lebanese angle is those that support and/or oppose Hizballahs weapons and I wasn't so much as disagreeing as stating that for both sets, the only way to undercut Hizballahs legitimacy as an armed resistance is a well armed army able to take its place. Its a matter of perception rather than whether you believe they would be an actual deterent or not.
Fiscaly, many Arab states would be willing to finance this if it saw the end of the power and popularity of Hizballah.
Since we both agree that this will never be allowed, we must agree that any engagement is futile.
It is astounding how both "backers" of the two sides are conspicuous by their silence.
For Jumblat, the Chouf is lost, for now (the mans too good a politician to ever discount outright) but he knows now hes not a target for them.
anon (bech?),
Yes, in an ideal world, all those things and in this world there has to be a place at the table for everyone in order to co-exist.
But there are certain real world issues that cannot be allowed to conitnue. The feudal system must be removed. Families running Lebanon like a their own personal company must end because while this continues the country cannot progress. If politicians are profiting at my expense, and saddling our country with the highest per capita debt in the world, I want them jailed, not allowed to continue because of coexistence.
That why I cannot respect the Totten gang. At least Hizballah has a good reason to not rock their relationship with Syria; What right does the likes of Totten or Badran have to ask me to continue to live as a serf and not fight the feudal lords? Their opposition to the likes of Hizballah is based on political ideology but bigotry, elitisim and arrogance and hey, if someone wants to be put me down because he thinks hes superior, he really shouldn't whine if i fight back.
Sean i wrote a long comment and now it's gone for some reason...
I have to go, but will soon have something on my blog addressing most of the questions raised in the last posts of Abu muqawama, especially to shift the attention a bit away from this blog! heheheh just joking ya AM..
and i'm not anon
rb,
Actually, I think you overstate the case. US policy in Lebanon post-Taif was mostly small ball and it was about as good as one could possibly hope for, especially now that we can see some of the contours of what an alternative more aggressive approach would be. Strengthen the army, dump wheat, civil society initiatives, establish clear rules for HA and Israel. I think it worked pretty well, the Syria-US condiminium over Lebanon in that it created a stability in which the Lebanon's many 'problems' could be worked out over time. The LAF right now owes its privileged national position to those efforts -- both american and syrian, and lebanese too. Am I putting lipstick on a pig, you bet, but anyone who remembers the slaughterhouse does well to appreciate the oink and the stink of the status quo.
Creeping engagement, I think, is the way forward and will remain so -- manichean propaganda notwithstanding. I could go on, but imagine i am boring some.
Mo,
Violent change in Lebanon will only strengthen its feudal character. Just at look at what happened during the civil war -- a whole new class of political leaders emerged and displaced others by virtue of their willingness to brandish arms. But what did this new generation do? They went right back to same corrupt patronage system that allowed for their emergence in the first place.
All those things you want are good and noble, but they are the work of decades, a million small, hard-fought victories to make Lebanon a better place for all. As any good numismatic -- such as you will find on this blog -- well tell you, the 'how' you fight for things is as important as the 'what' you fight for. Process and substance, but neither without the other.
Sean,
I assume you are aware of the shenanigans that have been going on between FM/PSP and SSNP over the last three years. To hell with all of them, sure, but dont take things out of context or lay it all at HA feet -- some blame, yes indeed, but context is necessary.
Given that I suggested that "Washington's only policy option at the moment is to stay quiet," I'm not quite sure how I overstate the case ;)
Greetings! I'm a newcomer to your blog. Are you all UK based? I hope to be travelling to the UK this summer to [re]visit my olde alma maters.
Anyway, Rami Kouri (via Helenna Cobban) has this to say:
The consequences of what has happened in the past week may portend an extraordinary but constructive new development: the possible emergence of the first American-Iranian joint political governance system in the Arab world. Maybe.
If Lebanon shifts from street clashes to the hoped-for political compromise through a renewed national dialogue process, it will have a national unity government whose two factions receive arms, training, funds and political support from both the United States and Iran. Should this happen, an unspoken American-Iranian political condominium in Lebanon could prove to be key to power-sharing and stability in other parts of the region, such as Palestine, Iraq and other hot spots. This would also mark a huge defeat for the United States and its failed diplomatic approach that seeks to confront, battle and crush the Islamist-nationalists throughout the region...
In what way, I wonder, isn't Hezbollah acting as part of the Lebanese Army? I can see a convergence of interests; in a sense, Hezb is acting as the "external department" of the army and the official army as the "internal security" department.
Also, the reliance on the fringe militias is a kind of franchise strategy. Hezbollah has certain core capabilities (like that phone system) other groups can use if they work for their interests. It's a fast way to grow.
Following the Druze trail, Guardian reports this : "The pro-government Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, who had controlled the mountain areas south-east of Beirut, ordered his fighters to stand down after fierce clashes with Hizbullah militants in which both sides kidnapped and executed rival supporters.
The area was turned over to the opposition Druze leader, Talal Arsalan, who asked the army to deploy."
Now am I wrong in thinking that this is control of quite a supply line? Im trying to think logistically. Any of you obviously learned folks care to talk a bit about lines/nodes of supplies in Lebanon? Because those guns the Hez were branishing sure looked totally new and western...
Wich again leads to the question on how much of this is gangster-warfare between rival bands controlling money-lines and how much this is political warfare, or rather how much it is a mix between the two to be more precise.
fnord, nothing to do with supply lines. Hizballah would not need to go through the Aley district to get any supplies from the Bekaa to Beirut
mo: I am not thinking vital supplies, but capital centers...
fnord:
This is political warfare (albeit, with some operational/terrain/geographic considerations).
rb: I agre that the maneuver is political. But the local missions arre not necessarily so. It is Lebanon. Lol, you gotta admit that even the rear of Hez is quite impressive.
How about the US pumps up any group that's willing to take on Hizballah - especially secular Shi'a - with all the money and weapons they could dream of while pushing a concerted IO campaign against Hizballah? Pretty short on details, but am I missing something?
On a side note: Is anyone else sick of Nir Rosen?
anon 10 38: What you going to do: Airdrop the weapons? And hope that clever people find them? Hezbollah controls Lebanon with a quiet beningn hand. The next political farce will include this factor. Insh allah.
Are you missing something? Build up a bunch of nothings to take on Hizballah? What shall we call this militia? Ducks in Barrel?
anon:
Combat effectiveness is not simply, or even largely, a function of money and weapons supply in a case like this--it has more to do with nonmaterial factors: morale/motivation, training, leadership (and especially experienced NCOs), discipline, OPSEC, etc. These take time to establish--you can't simply buy them.
Compare for, example, the (poor) combat effectiveness of the PLO (heavily armed but beset with cronyism) in south Lebanon in 1982 with that of Hizbullah in 2006, or for that matter the performance of PLO units in the south in 1982 versus their performance "backs against the wall" in Beirut in 1982 or (with much lighter weapons) in the "War of the Camps" against Amal in 1985-87.
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Also, for what its worth, I think the LA Times piece of Secure Plus rather overstates Mustaqbal paramilitary preparations.
Your comments about Future aren't really fair. Of course Sunni Beirutis have a reputation for being weak fighters and preferring to hire others to fight for them, but they had absolutely no chance, and Hariri told them to back down at the last minute.
As for the Chouf, I know a couple of guys who were on the front lines in Barouk, and they were scared and not prepared. They were able to beat Hezbollah, though, because it's their home turf, and they know every inch of those villages. But even so, Jumblatt's been telling them to put their weapons away, because at the end of the day, neither Hariri nor Jumblatt want their people to get slaughtered in what would clearly be an uneven fight. In Barouk, the PSP guys were severely outgunned, but they're defending their homes and families, and like I said, they know these areas like the back of their hands.
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