Calling All Readers: RFI
So Abu Muqawama got into a semi-public argument with one of the world's leading al-Qaeda experts today about a subject he wants you guys to weigh in on. Basically, Abu Muqawama advanced what he did not think a controversial proposition: that the internet is used by terror groups and guerrilla groups to spread TTPs -- tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The world-famous al-Qaeda expert, meanwhile, rubbished this claim. He said that while the internet was certainly central to the radicalization process, you need an actual physical space to spread tactics and know-how. He then challenged Abu Muqawama to come up with an example where a terror group had either used the internet to plan an attack or had used the internet to spread tactics.
Okay, so Abu Muqawama's RFI (Request For Information) is two-fold. One, who out there smart on diffusion theories -- that would be you, Mike, and you, Erin -- can either support or dispute the claim that the internet has been used to spread tactics? All the diffusion literature Abu Muqawama has read is a little dated in its case studies and examples. The best example Abu Muqawama can come up with is the way in which different terror/guerrilla groups have all begun to use Google Earth to target sites from Israel to Iraq. But did the internet drive that diffusion?
Two, who do you think is right here? Abu Muqawama or the famous (and very intelligent) al-Qaeda expert? Because Abu Muqawama trotted out Thomas Rid's line about digital natives versus digital immigrants and how younger U.S. Army officers have used sites like platoonleader.org to go around the traditional top-down lessons learned process. And let Abu Muqawama tell you: this esteemed expert did not like being called a digital immigrant -- with all the you're-too-old-and-I'm-young-and-hip connotations that go along with it. But Abu Muqawama thinks he's right. Folks over a certain age are much less likely to intuitively understand the way in which younger people -- digital natives -- share information and use the internet.
Thoughts?
38 comments:
This article shows how radical Islamists in Germany not only hatched a plan, but also build a bomb by using instructions found in an al Qaeda linked website. The article itself is from February 2007 and referred to the failed plot to bomb commuter trains in Germany in 2006.
Also, here's an Information Week article looking at an Electronic Jihad App which allowed the user to target specific IP addresses to take them down.
Finally, this article from Michael Scheuer, also from 2005 covers how the London and Sharm el Sheik attacks that year benefited from al Qaeda's internet program, and cites articles by Sayf al-Ad and Abu-Hajar Abd-al-Aziz al-Muqrin on how to conduct terrorist operations.
These are a bit more dated than you'd probably like, but I hope they help anyway.
I think you are looking at this wrong. To reject TTP's or lets call it learning you would have to reject all forms of Internet based education. That means all the online universities from Kaplan, Devry, Phoenix, and all the way to University of (pick a state) are all shams. The terrorism expert seems to be held back around 1950 and the "sage on the stage" mentality of learning and instruction. The Internet is a likely force multiplier for the radicalization process in that once a person is dumped into an echo-chamber of ideas the message is multiplied and supported. The terrorism expert seems to think that all entities involved in terrorism are "rag head rejects" and not the smart doctors and engineers from the London middle class.
Well, I'm surprised too. I don't see why there should be an either or, web or training-camp. It's both, and sometimes just one. Either one.
First, on spreading tactics: by coincidence I just met with Daniel Kimmage this same evening. He has a new report out on the jihadi use of the web for media work, including the spread of tactical manuals and videos -- it might be an illuminating read.
Second, on the need of physical space: one of the best texts I saw on this recently is a brilliant report in The Economist on mobility, particularly the article "Labour movement". Of course it helps to train and bond with peers, and the quality of your work probably gets better, but it's not necessary any more.
Third, on digital immigrants: manuals were always used to spread know-how: for cooks, engineers, architects, language students, you-name-it. The web made that not only more efficient by adding audio and video -- it enabled a new quality: creating relationships of trust online that pay off offline: dating and social networking wouldn't be much fun if everything would happen on screen and on phones. Digital natives understand that this creates a new basis for collaboration, peer-production, and, yes, the spread of know-how online.
It’s like cooking: recipes are a start, a cooking-show gets you going, but the best is firing-up the stove with a chef. But alone or with the help of friends you can still throw a dinner party -- and if it worked you post the show online.
I'm not stepping between you and Marc Sageman on something like this.
(It is Sageman, right? His new book is all over this sort of thing)
At some point, to learn how to go underground, AQ had to spread OPSEC and COMSEC training somehow then use it to get around U.S. surveillance. That stuff is out there, but it gets passed around by the AQ IT staff pretty quickly. Even in open rooms, encryption tech is getting recommended and evaluated.
On another note, video production techniques are being passed around too. So, make your favorite propaganda vid with Windows Movie Maker or Adobe Premier and Video Toaster for some special effects.
The Google Earth thing, while not a powerful as we think it is, it and other mapping/planning software is being bought/hacked to be spread to other groups who might use it.
Last, there's data being pushed around and being asked to get processed or identified. Noteworthy because it says, "Hey, we may not fight, but we'll crowdsource for your cause." Not good; AQ 2.0.
Diamondback 09
I am not so sure why the individual doubts the use of the internet by the global Salafi jihad movement especially QJBR, the Sunni insurgency groups, and for that matter most of the major North African Salafi groups. There was a article in the last nine months that spoke of the concept that AQ had in fact been the first insurgent group to move the physical battlespace to cyperspace.
As someone who records daily extensive battlevideo OSINT for the last several years and uses the same videos to train US military--your individual is failing or not wanting to admit the use of OSINT by an insurgency to do the following;
1. recruit---there is some discussion that says QJBR could in fact funnel 1000 FF per month into Iraq---all driven by the use of internet IO and insurgent battlevideos
2. the battle videos are in fact used to transfer TTPs and battle tactics globally either from Iraq to the rest of global Salafi insurgent groups or in fact from the Taliban or other groups back into Iraq. You could watch for example the Iraqi insurgency testing which IED was going to finally get a "clean kill" on the Stryker-once the the video was released with an IED that did split the Stryker into two pieces then in fact it became a standard IED attack against the Stryker. The same goes for the RGK3 anti tank grenade---first shown in an attack video and then in several later releases all using the same attack TTP---the same goes for the first QJBR SVIED attacks against the JSS concept-first one group released an attack video and then three attacks later by three different groups using the same attack TTP---the same thing on swarm attacks---first videoed and released by QJBR followed by swarm attack videos by Ansar al Sunnah/Islam and IAI. Another example has been the widespead use of the C5K rocket as a replacement by the Sunni groups for EFPs--- Ansar al Sunnah first released a single tube direct C5K attack against a BFV and then the technique became widespead amoung the other Sunni groups.
3. videos released on the internet are also a form of IO and actually but many do not realize is the ability of the videos to indoctrinate the actual cell members and how they reinforce each others beliefs.
There was also released recently another article titled "Read My Lips" that infers that in fact the global Salafi/Takfiri insurgency really does not care if we watch/listen as we the infidels/soldiers of the Cross are not the target audience of the videos and that intel analysts need to do far more OSINT analysis which I would venture could in fact provide 80-85% of all necessay information on the global jahadi movement and new and emerging TTPs.
There was for example about seven months ago a internet security manual that was released showing screenshoots of seven of the leading commerical internet security software packages with recommenadations on how to use the software to protect jahadi interent communications and in the middle of the 70 page manual were five pages on the use of manpads and how to aim them.
I am simply tired of this argument that an Iraqi, Somali, Algerian or someother Salafi group some how does not get the concept of the internet.
I could go on for at least another 50 examples of TTP tranfers all via insurgent battlevideos/IO videos---for a far better understanding of open source warfare refer to the book from John Robb "Brave New War".
This all links in to the ongoing Hoffman/Sageman spat, and Thomas Rid's assertion that the issue is not simply dichotomous is surely correct.
There is abundant evidence attesting to the use of the internet for a variety of purposes - to 'advertise, organise, proselytise and radicalise', as I've said elsewhere. I think AM is right that this is an uncontroversial thesis. The jury is out on the use of virtual worlds such as Second Life for the same purposes, although recent moves by the US and EU suggest that both regard these as a potential threat.
The 'digital native' idea is also largely correct. Again, there is a wealth of sociological literature to support this claim and a reluctance to accept this might partly explain why certain states have been so slow in addressing the use of digital environments by contemporary insurgents. (And also why some 'experts' seem content to ignore what I believe, as Selil says, are potential force-multipliers).
One point that is also worth making is that the use of digital environments has at times been overstated. The Second Life/terrorism issue is a case in point. In most parts of the world it is simply not possible to effectively run SL on the available ICT. Likewise, streaming video can be difficult to access when your local internet cafe has a 56k connection that drops every five minutes. These examples are a function of the 'digital divide' which is one reason why we cannot just impose a blanket interpretation.
But people are canny and if they perceive the internet as a tool (rightly, in my view) then they will find ways to exploit it. For those with access to broadband, this is a lot easier, but let's not forget that many internet tools (IRCs, forums, newsgroups, etc) require limited bandwidth and can, actually, be accessed through a properly enabled mobile phone, let alone a knackered old PC running Windows 95.
Like Diamondback09 I am also weary of the thesis that someone in the Algerian boondocks inherently doesn't 'get' the internet. Nonsense. Experience is beginning to show that it is precisely those without access to top notch ICT who exploit available technology best. On both counts that is not something we can say about the current COIN effort.
To add my five cents: The Danish "AQ group" recently caught was basiucally a bunch of kids who had gotten their ideas over the internet, including how to make crude bombs. Since the question is about TTP it seems a ridicolous statement for your adversory to make: Security procedures, encryption-skills, OPSEC-instructions and so forth are learned over the net. Sawahiris tactical discourse through the net also leaps to mind. Most importantly, I think, is the effect that the net has on recruiting, calling for young people to join the jihadis in Pakistan. Call it the salmon effect, the young being called back to the place of their origin to spawn, those who make it there are the ones hard enough to be welcomed.
As an aside, I had personal experience with being part of a generational conflict in Gothenburg 2001 during mr. Bush visit. Using mobilephones, internet and radio-scrambling the young folks were much better organized logistically than the police. Do not underestimate the net-to-mobile synchronization possibility, a savvy netoperator can make phones chime through 7 intermediate networks.
Thanks for all the tips, gang.
And no, it was *not* Sageman. But that's all I'm saying...
Well, this might seem to trivialise things a bit but when you talk about "needing" a physical space to transmit techniques, tactics and procedures...
http://www.bosskillers.com/
Your perspective is a certainty and the internet isn't simply used just by guerillas and terrorist to spread TTPs. Criminals and organized crime use it as well. I am an operations research analyst who recently met with law enforcement to track how the worlds of crime and terror are starting to overlap. They shared a situation where members of the arian brotherhood related gangs had hacked into the black guerila family related gangs and began using TTPs posted on their website. Anyone mildly interested has seen the jihadi sniper videos to train the "faithful." You are on target. Thanks for keeping the dialogue moving in this quickly changing threat environment.
-Kelly
far be it from me to weigh in on the sageman-hoffman slap fight but i think that AM's thesis is pretty hard to refute. Its not either/or, as other posters have said, but the web has undoubtedly become a vehicle for the dissemination of tactical and strategic guidelines.
You can look at the availability of lectures and books by al suri, muqrin, sayf al adl etc all online, almost nowhere in print. I dont even know that you could pick up a paper copy of al battar or sawt al jihad if you wanted it. The relevance of these can certainly be debated but it would be hard to argue that they dont have some type of effect. The al qaeda document supposedly outlining the strategic rationale for the madrid attacks was found on the computers of the attackers (interesting, if still circumstantial), al suris fingerprints are on a number of attacks etc...
Perhaps a prerequisite for a successful attack is some type of direct contact with al qaeda central- see the 7/7 bombings vs. the 7/21 bombings. Some knowledge just doesnt seem to transmit online.
"He said that while the internet was certainly central to the radicalization process, you need an actual physical space to spread tactics and know-how."
Why is this remotely controversial ? If it weren't the case, the US military should just junk all those villages staffed with Arab-Americans playing Iraqis and Afghans and have troops play networked versions of X-Box instead.
Based on personal experience, you can read all the books, theory and message boards out there, but to actually become proficient at a given skill, you need to physically practice it.
That being said, diffusion via the web allows lots and lots of keyboard jihadis to try. Many will fail some will succeed, and maybe that's enough for their purposes.
I would think Sageman would be on Abu Mook's side in this. More likely Hoffman. His piece in the most recent Foreign Affairs comes to mind.
"that the internet is used by terror groups and guerrilla groups to spread TTPs -- tactics, techniques, and procedures."
I dont see how thats a controversial statement at all. I agree with you. In general though I do think that there is an exaggarated sense of how influential AQ's media reach is in the Middle East.
You may find this interesting and useful Abu
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370103
I'm going to weigh in here, but only because I'm surprised that this is still being debated the way that it is.
AM: the internet is used by terror groups and guerrilla groups to spread TTPs -- tactics, techniques, and procedures.
AQ Expert: while the internet was certainly central to the radicalization process, you need an actual physical space to spread tactics and know-how
1. Not only is this not an either-or issue, but judging from the way you wrote it up - and the way your audience responded - everyone's talking past each other on the very basic elements of this.
2. I suppose my root assertion is: define "spread". Instruction and learning involve a range of practices and processes, but in absence of applied learning, the "spreading" of "tactics", "techniques", and "procedures" is nothing more than "sensitization" to TTPs. That's a far cry from being able to demonstrate proficiency through applied knowledge.
3. The process of learning and communication is not divorced from the physical world. Regardless of the kind of primary activity the insurgent or terrorist is involved with, the physical NEVER goes away until he's dead. Ideas can persist and evolve independent of any one entity. But there's no such thing as an insurgent or terrorist conducting the sharp kinetic end of the operational spectrum while in a disembodied state. That - the virtual havens argument - is what's been exaggerated, and I suspect that that's the point Mike Scheuer was making. :)
4. I know that there are manuals for any number of activities - say, flying aircraft - but if I don't spend time studying them AND applying that learning by actually getting into the cockpit and into the air, I'm probably not going to get too far as a pilot. So, "spread" is a big word, whichever way you cut the argument.
Sorry, maybe the pilot analogy is a bit tasteless - not meant that way.
5. The last point I'll mention is that disputes over physical vs. virtual domains - read the sanctuary discourse in U.S. policy - has always been overblown. The most sensible approach I've seen on this is David Kilcullen's 2003-2004 ADF concept paper, Future Land Operations Concept: Complex Warfighting.
That document, and the thinking behind it, have been extremely influential in shaping contemporary COIN, asserting that the real and metaphorical enemy "terrain" is complex, not simple, and warfighters need to approach it in terms of its physical and material conditions, human & demographic conditions, and informational & cognitive dimensions - not in isolation one from the another, but as part of thick weave of obstacles to clean, direct, linear combat.
6. Despite its post-modern flavor, that approach also never loses sight of the fact that at the end of the day, the blood you shed isn't a poor pixilated facsimile on a computer screen, but the real slippery deal, in the real world.
It applies to the sea for sure.
Pirates in somalia use everything from registers for the suez canal to IM for monitoring the locations of coalition ships off the Horn of Africa. Knowing where they are makes them easier to avoid when conducting a capture.
Tactics and techniques are discussed on websites, examples include best tools to board a large ship and pictures of ships to improve tactical action during boarding.
Most of the sites I've seen in this regard are in French and Portuguese, meaning its a very safe bet the US Navy and other coalition nations are unaware, or don't monitor those activities.
Many but not all of those sites usually go down within days of being put online.
Classic IRC and NNTP are often the protocols of choice that I've seen for TTP. My guess is the guy you debated lives in an HTTP world driven by Google.
er..meant to say... safe bet they are aware, and monitor those activities.
The esteemed expert is yet another example of a 20th century man trapped in the 21st century.
I like the Complex Terrain Lab guys. They're wicked smaht. Could be the savvy anthropological approach and the possible theories of artifact transfer related to socio-spatial dynamics?
BBC jihad.com
Sounds willfully ignorant to me. How you gonna claim to be in the business of terrorism analysis but that you've never met SITE institute, where these internet lessons roll out every week.
"far better understanding of open source warfare refer to the book from John Robb "Brave New War"."
He is very smart on that topic (perhaps none better) but, like Schneier, has a tendency to misrepresent terrorist actions to shape them into supporting his writings.
-Kilo
What about Irhaabi007? He was encouraging all kinds of terrorist related activities until arrested a couple of years ago.
oh, and odds are that the expert was Abu Aardvark aka Mark Lynch...?
I base my assumption on the fact that A) He and Abu M attended the same conference and B) He has an interesting post up at his blog regarding AQ and the net...
You could should them my blog The Revolution Script and my Clustr Map in the side bar. Now I am not claiming that anything that I have written as actually influenced any real insurgency groups, but the fact that I, The Red Son living in America can share my knowledge with people in over one hundred countries says something about the potential for the diffusion of TTPs and other information via the Interweb.
I can at least say that jihadi magazines, such as Muaskar al-Battar and Sawt al-Jihad are not effective tools for training militants...
A quick look at the contents shows that although at face they contain tips and tricks, the majority are basic stuff like wilderness survival that you could find in the boy scout handbook, or OPSEC information so basic (my favorite example is "do not leave operational notes out on tables - burn all information after it is used") and inane ("when buying cars for operations, do not buy the cheapest vehicle available - you want to make sure it will run when you need it") that I cannot honestly believe people are sitting around studying this information.
aaron: Then you have a problem understanding the mind of a 17 year old. Visualize a disgruntled 17-20 sitting in his boys room in Brompton, swallowing all that shit "live". From my conversations with a lot of various muslims, *they are exactly as naive and gullible as the US public*. Again, its a salmon process, even if 90% perish on the way to the source, the remaining 10% are quite a few. I think we in the west sometimes forget what an insult it is for US troops to be in the muslim holy places like Najaf, etc.
In the states, you have Long Black Coats, in Europe you have Disgruntled Muslims (as well as nazis, fascists and various other groups of loonies of course..). One interesting factor is that while somalians seem to fit right in in the US, over here they are the lowest of the low on the peckingorder of immigrants.
sorry for overposting, but to expand on the post above: As a young punk, 15 years old, I remember coming across the anarchist cookbook and the amazing sortiment of Palladin Press. "How to kill like a CIA agent", etc. The point about the sites aaron mentions, the Boy Scout stuff is that they are very intelligent, because they create a sub-culture inside muslim youth-scenes. By having such sites, they A) provide an easy entrance into a role as jihadi for closed friend-circles who take their religion seriously ("Mustafa, did you remember to burn all the traces?") and B) an entrance into a military mindset.
I remember in my first job as a doorman, just 17, my colleague was an old navy hunter. We systematically planned to wipe out our hometowns entire population of drinkers because we were bored. It involved o-plans for all the major drinking places, and where to place explosives etc. Today, we would be suspect terrorists, but in 88 it was just a laugh. My point is, its easy to underestimate the fascination that the military way of thinking can have on young minds. In that sense, the "stupid" sites are ideal recruiting tricks.
fnord,
I can not imagine you to be a "punk". . .punk rocker, maybe. And why did you want to get the winos? More for you doormen?!
Diamondback 09
Interesting development--- several days ago an IED strike on a US vehicle was filmed and released by two separate Iraqi insurgent groups.
This was a first time event where joint IO for the internet was being driven----a sort of "hey look we are so organized that two groups can carry out a joint attack and organize even the video work together".
Fnord - I understand your point that they may be effective RECRUITING tools, but keep in mind AbuM was talking about whether these sources are effective without the need to attend a physical training camp.
I would argue that, at least for the sources I mentioned, if they do get you in the military mindset (which I do buy as fully plausible) it would be a first step in encouraging you to attend one of these physical training camps. By themselves, though, they are propaganda and not an effective training tool.
aaron: Fair point. However, I would still point out that these sites may function as a first step in a multi-stepped process. X number of individuals read this and get a military mindset, Y number of these actually immerse themselves into the subculture making it their identity, and Z number of people go on to actually do something about it. How many western net-sites are aimed at arabic-speaking possible recruits, btw, in order to fill that gap? As IO operation, where is the effort to create positive "warrior" models for muslim kids?
Lisa: It was a very very very christian town, with lots of rude drunks on Friday heading to church on Sunday. You had to be there to understand. It made eminent sense at the time. (Disclaimer: At no point were we serious..)
OMG, who killed all the straw men? I'm with Complex Terrain Lab in terms of understanding the argument, but it strikes me as inane.
Let's look at an example here: a jihadi reads an internet article -- let's assert that this is his only possible source for this information -- on the proper way to use a mil-dot reticle and then goes out and practices with his rifle. Abu M. is arguing that the internet was critical to the process and the rebuttal is that the jihadi still had to go out and practice?
Sounds like another intellectually overbred academic who's more in love with his mind than advancing COIN. If only practice is required, then let's save some money by stopping the creation and distribution of all military manuals.
We agree with Anonymous - to a point.
The issue isn't simply that terrs still need to go out and practice, and that that's the requirement for physical space. It is a requirement, at least for acquiring a level of proficiency and the ability to implement.
The requirement for physical space, though, is broader than that. It may be disingenuous to suggest that there's an absolute requirement for physical space, regardless of where a terr is in the recruitment or operational process. But the plain fact is that the terr, his colleagues, and their organization, don't cease to be a corporeal entities, even when reading by remote over digital media.
More, the problem of digital media isn't non-physical. Here we need to step back and define terms, before trying to describe the problem.
The "internet" and the "world wide web" are two different things. Our knowledge of this end of things is superficial, so an expert on strategic communications (Matt?) might like to chime in.
The internet is the distributed network of computing resources that allow the collected information it contains called the "web" to function - which makes it a physical space. The web, furthermore, can only be accessed via the physical media of the net, ie. through a computer of some kind, its visual (monitor), tactile (keyboard, mouse) and sensory (web cam, microphone) interfaces . By extension, interfacing via the web, through internet resources, is a physical act requiring a blend of material, human, and cognitive presence.
In this sense, the use of online media as an extended C2 mechanism - understood broadly - isn't really all that different from the use of broad spectrum communications strategies in places like Rwanda, Liberia, which were albeit very different scales, concentrations, and types of conflict.
There, radio was the physical media, exploiting national broadcast infrastructure and ubiquitous sub-tactical receivers (hand-held radios) to control public information and transmit the expectations of the power elite - in others words, guidance.
These were also primarily oral societies with high rates of illiteracy - hence culturally susceptible. Not to widespread anomie and interpersonal violence, but to both medium and message. The function was distributed command and control under materially unclear circumstances, and the outcome was social diffusion (to varying degrees) of destructive ideas.
There's more to the argument, but I'll cut it short with that. Sorry to fixate, but we do need to define our terms of reference on this one.
Diamondback 09
It should be noted that a wise insurgent when once asked "where did you do you rifle training" replied---"every Iraqi is born with a rifle".
In 2005 through early 2007, it could be argued that the various insurgent groups, would dry fire in their local safehouse courtyard, hold weapons assemble and disassemble training in that same courtyard following CDs that had been sent to them from a fellow Emir in Baghdad and then after 1. watching the videos, 2. doing dry fire in the courtyard,
3. throw their weapons in the trunck of their own BFV (really a white 4 door Opel) and then head for the nearest reconned IP/IA checkpoint for some "live fire exercises". Following the insurgent Darwinian principle that only the smartest insurgents live to fight any day.
tibia money tibia gold tibia item runescape accounts buy runescape accounts runescape money runescape gold runescape gp runescape power leveling runescape powerleveling cheap rs2 powerleveling runescape equipment buy rs equipment runescape runes cheap rs2 runes runescape logs cheap rs2 logs runescape items buy runescape items runescape quest point rs2 quest point cheap runescape questpoint runescape gold runescape items runescape power leveling runescape money runescape gold buy runescape gold buy runescape money runescape items runescape accounts runescape gp runescape accounts runescape money runescape power leveling runescape powerleveling tibia gold dofus kamas buy dofus kamas wow power leveling wow powerleveling runescape questpoint rs2 questpoint Warcraft PowerLeveling Warcraft Power Leveling World of Warcraft PowerLeveling World of Warcraft Power Leveling Hellgate money Hellgate gold buy runescape logs buy rs2 items cheap runescape items Hellgate London gold Guild Wars Gold buy Guild Wars Gold runescape items rs2 accounts cheap rs2 equipments lotro gold buy lotro gold buy runescape money buy runescape gold buy runescape runes lotro gold buy lotro gold runescape money runescape gold cheap rs2 powerleveling eve isk eve online isk buy runescape power leveling rs2 power leveling tibia gold tibia item runescape accounts Fiesta Silver Fiesta Gold SilkRoad Gold buy SilkRoad Gold Scions of Fate Gold Hellgate Palladium Hellgate London Palladium SOF Gold Age Of Conan Gold AOC Gold ArchLord gold tibia money tibia gold runescape accounts runescape gold cheap rs2 powerleveling buy ArchLord gold DDO Plat Dungeons and Dragons Online Plat
Air Jordan shoes Air Jordan shoesjordan shoes
Air Jordan shoesjordans shoes
Cheap Jordans
wholesale jordan
Air Jordan shoes
wholesale air jordan
Nike Jordan Shoes
Nike Shoes Wholesale
wholesale air jordans Air Jordans
Wholesale Nike shoes Air Jordans
Air JordansWholesale Nike Air Jordans
Air JordansNike shoes Air Jordans
nike jordan Air Jordans
air jordan Air Jordans
Air Jordans Air Jordans
Post a Comment