Wednesday, May 7, 2008

Awakening to New Dangers

With all the focus on intra-Shia conflict over the past month, Dr. iRack wanted to draw readers' attention for a moment back to a silent storm brewing: the fate of the "Sons of Iraq." For more than a year, Sunni security volunteers fighting AQI and safeguarding their own neighborhoods have demanded integration into the Iraqi army and police. But very few of the 90,000 mostly Sunni SoIs (including many re-hatted "former" insurgents and even some members associated with AQI) have been integrated or otherwise guaranteed gainful employment by the Iraqi government. Instead, sectarian bias prevails, leaving U.S. forces to pick up the tab and keep them in line. This is not sustainable, and frustrations are growing. Consider this story from Adhamiyah, once one of Baghdad's most violent districts but now calmed (at least temporarily) by the cooperation between SoIs and U.S. forces:

A year ago, Adhamiyah was one of the bloodiest districts in Baghdad. In the past few months, scores of shops have reopened in corners where soldiers remember the stench of rotting corpses. Men crowd outside cafes on streets once prowled by young thugs riding motorbikes and wielding assault rifles.

In the center of Adhamiyah, the Abu Hanifa mosque, one of the most prominent Sunni shrines in Baghdad, glowed under exterior lights. A year ago, soldiers said, gunmen opened fire on U.S. Humvees nearly every time they passed it.

Now, the challenge confronting the Americans is how to cement a peace that will not unravel after they leave.

Friction and Frustration

The Awakening fighters are growing increasingly frustrated that Iraq's Shiite-led central government has been slow to integrate them into the Iraqi police and military services. U.S. officers say the fighters appear to be breaking into factions.

Roadside bombs have suddenly become more prevalent in Adhamiyah. The U.S. military said 21 bombs were found in the area in the last 25 days of April, compared with three or four in all of March. Platoon leaders on patrol at Awakening checkpoints at the end of April sought information about the origins of fresh graffiti in support of the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq.

"It's escalating," said a checkpoint leader who gave his name as Abu Ahmad. "Some of the Awakening are chanting for al-Qaeda and using slogans for al-Qaeda. I think the district will pay the price because of these problems."

Leaders from the Awakening are blaming U.S. troops for not ridding the force of those who previously ruled the district. "The problem is with the Americans," Abu Ahmad said. "They know who the guys are who previously worked with al-Qaeda, but they are not doing anything about it. When we catch someone, we know they are killers and thugs, yet they release them."

The U.S. military acknowledges that many Awakening fighters were once members of al-Qaeda in Iraq. "Naturally there is some distrust and disbelief among these members," said Maj. Michael S. Humphreys, a spokesman for the Army. "But with time and continued cooperation and teamwork they will quickly learn to trust each other as brothers, as many of them already have."

Application Holdup

U.S. military officers in Adhamiyah said they were not sure who was responsible for the growing number of roadside bombs -- extremists sneaking back into the neighborhood or factional leaders jockeying for power. The U.S. military has more than 2,200 Awakening fighters in Adhamiyah and nearby neighborhoods.

Military officers said they have tried numerous avenues to get Awakening fighters hired into the Iraqi security forces, but they say they have no evidence that the vast majority of applications have been acted upon.

"Everyone in our chain of command acknowledges that the government of Iraq would be wise if they were to acknowledge the Sunnis," said Maj. Ike Sallee, operations officer for the 3rd Squadron. "Just give these guys a paycheck, a weapon and ID cards. Just acknowledge them and get them into shape. Hold them accountable."

One Army civil affairs officer in Adhamiyah said applications had been returned because they were submitted in the wrong color of ink. The Americans say they are not sure if it's just bureaucratic fumbling or if the applications are being blocked as sectarian payback.

Many of the people who live in Adhamiyah were affiliated with Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. The last images of Hussein in public, a day before the American military captured Baghdad, show him amid throngs of cheering supporters in front of the Abu Hanifa mosque. Since then, power has shifted to political parties representing the country's Shiite majority.

Even as the security environment in the district improves, Sallee said problems require constant attention. U.S. officers in Adhamiyah said that they expect the military to continue to pay the $300 monthly salaries of the Awakening fighters, and that it's in the military's interest to keep paying.

"All of Iraq is like embers," Sallee said. "Some places just flare up, so you constantly have to keep tending the embers. That's the best we can do, is get them to embers. But Americans can't extinguish the embers."

Over the past year, the "surge" of U.S. combat forces and improved COIN doctrine played an important part in security improvements in Iraq. Even more important, however, were the decisions by a majority of Iraqi combatants to either switch sides (Sunni tribes and insurgents) or stand on the sidelines (JAM). As U.S. forces thin out, Sunni grievances go unaddressed, and the JAM ceasefire buckles under the strain of intra-Shia conflict and a coalition offensive, the pillars of progress are starting to shake. There will be no re-surge. There will be no "do over." We have to get this right . . . and get it right right now. The clock is ticking. The only solution is a political one, and it will involve pushing the Maliki government to move much faster to co-opt Sunni and Shia combatants. Tick, tock.

11 comments:

fnord said...

From a very very cynical point of view: Is there a substantial reward for finding and reporting a roadsidebomb? Because then, planting and reporting might be a good business-venture.

Another angle is that the official plan is for approx 30000 out of 90000 are to be integrated into the official Iraqi forces, right? Now, who does the vetting on that? Is there an actual transition-plan in existence, or are they just winging it, anyone know?

HN said...

The clock is ticking but a political solution won't happen. Bush doesn't appear to understand or desire diplomacy. The only thing he has shown any penchant for is swaggering and using US troops as a penile extension.

hn said...

fnord: what about the other 60,000? Should they just go home without a way to support their families? They have no other prospects, so they will go right back to insurgency.

Scott Wedman said...

So then what, exactly, should we do? Great critical analysis, but what is the solution? What does it mean, precisely, to pressure the Iraqi government to incorporate various groups? Is there a particular carrot we can offer if they do it and stick we can promise if they do not?

Dr. iRack said...

Scott,

The stick is to threaten to abandon the GoI by starting a phased withdrawal; the carrot is to promise to pause the withdrawal and provide them residual support (which they badly desire) if and only if they move toward political compromise.

fnord said...

hn: Wich was my sort of underlying point.

But, its not a given that they will "fall back into insurgency" if handled the right way. Is there a micro-credit system up and running? Are there any large, well funded localy run roadbuilding projects being started to take the brunt of the people into well paid job. And, heresy of heresies , are there any subsidized companies producing stuff that are protected from the cold hand of the market? Has the US gotten over its collective nationbuilding-denial trauma? The role of the local economy in COIN is undermentioned, and the magical forces of the free market are highly overrated. To put it mildly.

mutt said...

fnord, you hit the nail on the head. I believe the answer is No, because theres no financial profit to be realized by the wars backers- the US is in the grip of serious crackpot ideologues, & virtually every move we make is designed to either demonstrate thier theories ("privatize" everything in sight) or grab profits thru "contracting". Results actually dont matter, because no one is called to account. They held thier breaths back when, & saw they got away with Viet Nam. and now the rats are out of the tunnel..... its what a lot of Latin Americans call "impunidad"- impunity- which they use to describe the (inevitably US backed) murderous kleptocracies that are our "democratic allies in the region"
We now have or OWN murderous kleptocracy....
remember the 20 odd Nepalize (?) laborers machine gunned in the earlyist days of the Occupation? Importing laborers. To Iraq. By the thousands. or the huge contracts for Turk cement while Iraqi cement plants were idle?
All on the backs of our soldiers, our 'best and brightest" in a real sense.
like being late & cutting back on payments to Awakeining groups......short sighted, no actual planning, ..........criminal impunity.

Scott Wedman said...

Dr. Irack. . thanks for the clarification -- that makes some sense.

Soldiernolongeriniraq said...

"Over the past year, the "surge" of U.S. combat forces and improved COIN doctrine played an important part in security improvements in Iraq. Even more important, however, were the decisions by a majority of Iraqi combatants to either switch sides (Sunni tribes and insurgents) or stand on the sidelines (JAM)."

But Dr Irak, how does one separate the dancer from the dance?

A prime motivator for JAM to stand down, especially after the disastrous (and failed) operations against Badr in Najaf and Karbala was the influx of US troops hard up against Sadr City, the only remaining uncontested portion of Moqtada al-Sadr's realm.

Moreover, it was the realization within MNF-I that we could exploit the so-called Sunni "Awakening" alongside the so-called "Surge" that proved key, too. It's one thing to be offered a seed, quite another to recognize just how swell that lowly seed will be once it bears fruit. Give Odierno some credit for recognizing just how important the initial "Awakening" offering as relayed by subordinates in Anbar could become.

Caveat: In the M(i)TT, we had been saying the exact same freakin' thing in 2005-06. We had to get rid of a certain BCT in order to make it so.

Regardless, Iraq is not a crude "either, or" syllogism. It's more like a very complex "if, then."

If the US hadn't "surged," it's quite doubtful that al-Sadr would've called his truce, even after the debacles against Badr.

If the US hadn't had the troops on hand to prosecute counter-insurgency campaigns in BOTH Anbar AND the Baghdad AOs, it's quite unlikely that the "Awakening" would have been so fruitful.

If the US hadn't had enough surged troops on hand to extend operations into Diyala, it's moreover doubtful that the "Awakening" would have caught fire there, too.

And if we had a different cast of characters in OIF instead of GEN Petraeus and his staff, it's also highly unlikely that the commanders would have realized the opportunities offered by the "Awakening" sheikhs, much less exploited them.

"The only solution is a political one (...)"

The "political" business is becoming as banal as "special groups." In the Greek sense of the word, certainly everything is "political." In Iraq, one must puzzle over the direction in which these "political" changes progress.

The so-called "Surge" staffers realized that with the "Awakening," a new PRT structure and other reforms and (good) surprises, the best way forward would be a ground-up, not top-down political "reconciliation" process.

By which they eventually came to suggest meant securing the population first, protecting key local leaders and institutions, then moving on to the sorts of "reconciliation" that would lead to brining more Sunni Arabs into the security forces, more former Baathists into the government and political process and more Shi'i dissidents into regional political structures that would work for all affected parties.

Obviously, it has proven easier to do the former than the latter, and there's no guarantee that we have enough time (tick tock) weighed against domestic US opinion to achieve much in the way of a national "reconciliation" that would make everyone so unhappy and yet so happy that they would quit fighting.

While time isn't exactly on our side, it's also not necessarily on the side of the various insurgencies, too. Certainly, the clock seems to have tolled for AQIZ and much of the organic salafist struggle within northern and western Iraq.

I quite doubt that it's tolled for JAM, JAM-like groups or NICE and other political elements loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, but it might.

Soldiernolongeriniraq said...

"Are there any large, well funded localy run roadbuilding projects being started to take the brunt of the people into well paid job."

Fnord, the roads in Iraq actually are pretty good. Most of the highways you would find to be fairly similar to modern European roadways.

Rural roads, especially in the south, aren't particularly good, but those are the areas that are getting the most attention from the national government for a variety of reasons, some of them good.

As for the "free market" in Iraq, it reverted, as I knew it would in 2003, to the same sort of klepto-capitalism that's always ruled how things are bought and sold there.

If you think the addled US attempt to "privatize" Iraq was bad, imagine the many failed enterprises of the Hussein regime to socialize a joint that conceived of trade along the lines of (what else?) family, tribe and village/neighborhood.

Every commodity in Iraq today is marketed in this way, and the more important the commodity (fuel, telecommunications, materiel contraband) the more likely it's handled by various militia/criminal rackets.

If you really want to know what's causing so much of the violence in the south between Fadhila, Badr, JAM and JAM-like groups, you might want to inquire into the trade in smuggled fuel products.

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