Dr. iRack Ponders Basra
Dr. iRack here. He wants to thank AM for adding him to the list of guest bloggers! If anybody out there is wondering about the origins of Dr. iRack's “handle,” check out this video.
For the first entry, Dr. iRack thought he’d revisit some unanswered questions regarding last month’s debacle in Basra.
We all know that Maliki’s recent Basra operation did not go as planned, but the fiasco is still puzzling in a number of respects. Why was it so poorly planned and executed with so little coordination with the Americans? And what explains the timing of the assault? Why would the Iraqis (or the Americans) risk rushing into a major offensive that might cause Sadr’s ceasefire (a major cause of the “progress” associated with the surge) to unravel so close to the Petraeus/Crocker testimony?
The standard narrative suggests that the operation caught the Americans by surprise. In an interview with the New York Times, Ambassador Crocker said, “The sense we had was that this would be a long-term effort: increased pressure gradually squeezing the Special Groups. That is not what kind of emerged.” Based on information from a number of my U.S. and Iraqi contacts, a clearer picture is now coming into view. It seems that Maliki’s initial plan was to go after 100 JAM/“special groups” targets in Basra with close ties to Iran. Dr. iRack suspects the lion’s share of this effort was supposed to be carried out by Iraqi special forces in conjunction with U.S. special operations and air assets, with the regular Iraqi Army largely playing a supporting role.
Reporting suggests that the operation was planned for July and Maliki pushed it up with limited warning to MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy, catching the Americans with their pants down. During his testimony, Petraeus said he was first told about the operation on Friday, March 21, just a handful of days before the operation kicked off. Maliki traveled down to Basra on Monday, March 24 to personally oversee the operation, and the assault commenced the following day.
Contrary to this account, Dr. iRack has heard from his sources that MNF-I had several weeks (or more) of warning. Dr. iRack originally dismissed this claim because he assumed that the U.S. military would have strongly opposed an all-out assault just prior to the Petraeus/Crocker testimony. But if it was not supposed to be an all-out assault then the pre-testimony timing actually makes some sense. A targeted set of Iraqi-led raids against JAM special groups in Basra would show (1) that Maliki and the ISF were taking the initiative against Shia militias, and (2) that Maliki was willing to police the expanding chaos on Basra and protect the port. In other words, a limited operation would show “progress”—and that would be a reason for the Americans to support it in the pre-testimony period.
Regardless of how much warning the Americans had, it is still a puzzle why an operation that was supposed to be targeted set of raids evolved into a frontal assault? The conventional wisdom attributes it to plain old Iraqi bungling. But, again, some new information from my sources complicates this picture. Apparently, the details of the assault were leaked to JAM (no surprise given militia infiltration of the ISF). And, in an attempt to pre-empt Maliki’s plan, JAM began attacking Iraqi Army units as they moved south and shelled the prime minister upon his arrival in Basra. This brought JAM-proper into the game—not just the special groups—and Maliki responded by ordering regular Iraqi Army units into the city, escalating the operation far beyond its original design. This puts into context something else Crocker told the Washington Post on April 3: “I was not expecting, frankly, a major battle from Day One. But then again it's not clear to me that they'd decided that's what they were going to do. The enemy has a vote in combat.”
Plausible? Yes, it certainly would account for a lot of the lingering questions about the offensive. True? Dr. iRack doesn't know for sure. But this is certainly worth further investigation, especially since the end result of all of this was a fiasco that dragged U.S. forces into the fray and brought Iraq to the brink of an intra-Shia civil war.
33 comments:
Not to worry, Dr. iRack. Yep, there's a Dr. iRan makin' thin'z safe for the surge.
What do you think the Fallout has been? Is it too early to tell? Or are we seeing change already?
The buzz among the paranoid apocaplytic bloggers is that Maliki got his marching orders direct from Cheney March 17th --
http://www.concordbridge.net/iraq-iran-war_week2.htm
In defense of the paranoid community, I rush to point out that sober assessments like this one from the National Defense University --
www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OP5.pdf
-- provide a ready rorschach for those of my ilk on which to project our anxieties.
[Hyper-]Vigilantly yours,
Dwight Whayle
(PS: Call me, Ismael.)
Dr. Irack have you read any coalition reports in the last few weeks. The coalition and the IA kept fighting in Basra, they have kicked out the Mahdi army, and the Basra residents are happy about it.
Dear Doc;
Great first post, honest, objective, and based on my assessment of things spot-on for the information available now.
I think your post also points to how senior folks in Iraq mis-understand the nature of the war there. It is almost like we have reduced the war in Iraq to a set of processes; that is to say the components of the process are a discrete act with no reaction to them.
But as we know war is not like that at all and when you apply military force, which on the ground usually entails killing, death, and destruction, then things change, and events that you thought would happen spiral into a million different configurations.
This at the theoretical level seems to me to what had happened in Basra.
keep up the postings; you are 19 times better than your point guard.
gian
dr irack: One point we still havent heard much of were the corresponding actions in the outlying areas, such as Kut and Nasiriyah. At one point, it seemed like JAM was active along the whole MSR. Care to comment on how serious that threat was?
And is it only me who get a distinct feeling that we are reverting to 12th century politics here? The sultan of Baghdad allied with the crusader forces try to take the independent city of Basra?
Think its been plugged here before, but Reidar Visser has a very interesting article over at http://www.historiae.org/iran.asp. The complexities of the Basra political scene are amazing. Sayyid al-Shuhada? Tharallah militia? Hezbollah IN Iraq and Hezbollah OF Iraq, and none connected to Leb. Hezbollah? The mind boggles.
However, one point stands out clearly:
"...In sum, the Iraqi system is locked at the top level. The artificial constellation of the so-called “moderate coalition” under Maliki is to a large extent the result of a weaponry-focused American misreading of the many channels of Iranian influence. This was best summed up by Ryan Crocker’s comments in the US Senate on 8 April: in an attempt at playing down the significance of Mahmud Amadinejad’s popularity in Iraqi government circles, Crocker referred to the staunch anti-Iranian attitude of the Iraqi Shiites during the Iran-Iraq War. What Crocker failed to mention was that his own administration’s main Shiite partner in Iraq, ISCI, is the only sizeable Shiite party that fought on the Iranian side."
Ouch.
You're on notice, Gian: Momma Muqawama just sent me an email wondering who this heretic was talking down her son.
Doc:
One thing your analysis leaves out is the Maliki/Sadr political dynamics (touched on by Vissar). There's another theory - in reference to the law barring political parties with militias participating in the upcoming elections, seen as a move against the Sadr Current - that this was an effort by Maliki to take down Sadr's power base. How do you read that? Was this part of a take-down operation?
To me, it makes a certain amt. of sense, with a few caveats. As the main guarantors of security to poor Shi'ites, and the (armed) public face of the Sadr Current and the provider of its social services, they would be the natural target.
The big caveat (inspired by fnord) comes from the fact that this operation was not carried out anywhere except for Basra and (sorta) in Sadr City, while JAM commands a lot of support throughout the south.
Dr Irak, I don't know if you're part of the aforementioned Visser's email chain, but he recently forwarded this about the unusal promotion-as-demotion moves of Mohan al-Firayji and Abd al-Jalil Khalaf and the firings of Mohammed Jawad Huwaydi and Adil Dahham (Basra's police chief):
"ISCI members circulated rumours about yet another attempt to have Maliki replaced by ISCI’s own Adil Abd al-Mahdi, not least because of dissatisfaction with Maliki’s centralist stance on the provincial powers act. Crucially, the rumours of a replacement of Mohan in Basra antedated all these events. Apparently, then, the dominant parties of the Maliki government have been brought closer together by the latest series of crises, rather than having pursued a shared agenda consistently for several months."
I don't think it's fair to post the entire missive because he has his own site and publishes widely in other fora; if he should wish for it to be on the internet, he'll do so in his own way.
The best part of the letter was the brutal reality that the "Iranian influence" the deposed security officers were complaining to al-Maliki about weren't direct at Sadr, but rather the flunkies near Basra in ISCI and the Sayyid al-Shuhada movement.
But we can't say that, lest all the Bill Roggios of the world and conservative milbloggers everywhere realize that al-Maliki's Dawa, ISCI, Fadhila, et al, all have key leaders who originally punched a clock in Iran or Syria.
To me, the fact that when it came time to arbitrate the dispute between al-Maliki, al-Hakim, al-Sadr, et al, all parties turned to the Iranians, no MNF-I.
It doesn't really matter when the US (if ever) was fully told about the upcoming operations (al-Maliki recently had threatened to do the same thing in Mosul, and even went up there after the gruesome neighborhood bombing as if to "direct" operations, if you recall). What matters is in the aftermath, the crucial power to be consulted wasn't the US, but Iran.
Blah.
"The big caveat (inspired by fnord) comes from the fact that this operation was not carried out anywhere except for Basra and (sorta) in Sadr City, while JAM commands a lot of support throughout the south."
Actually, there were operations in Nasiriya and Kut, too.
For those who don't know, ISCI's militias (we term them "Badrists") have been carrying out an underground war against the Sadr-affliated (there's always question about the actual degree of "affiliation"), largely successfully, in Najaf and Karbala. Now, al-Hakim would like to see a "super-state" for the south, thus splitting al-Sadr's movement between Baghdad-East-to-Iran and Basra-North-to-Baghdad, allocating for Badr Organization the spoils of the south, where he believes his militias overall are more powerful.
Head to head, they certainly have proved tougher than Sadr's loose affiliations in the holiest cities. In Basra, however, one might like to point out that Fadhila hasn't been able to budge JAM and JAM's allies despite ongoing bloodshed, and Fadhila aren't a bunch of wussies.
As if on cue, Iran holds press conference/rally highlighting the fact that its missiles can hit US targets in Iraq and the Gulf, plus Israel.
Click on name for creepy image.
And al-Maliki tells the EU and NATO that Iraq is "on the verge of victory against terrorists and outlaws." So come and invest!
Click on name for story and the most boring photograph ever taken.
In other Iraqi newspapers today, pro-Iranian members of parliament BLAME THE US for poor planning and execution of the Basra operations. Amazing.
The papers also carry the line that Petraeus knew that al-Maliki wanted to move on Basra's Sadrist enclaves, but stressed a "gradualist" approach. Al-Maliki did what he did regardless, and now declares it a "victory" to the EU.
Uhhhh, ok.
Meanwhile, as earlier mentioned, mr. Cheney and mr. Bush are seriously worried about Al Quaeda overrunning the oilfields of Kirkuk and Basra and establishing a AQ state with their compatriots in Iran. There was some sort of quip being made at the start of this conflict by some neo-con about the loosers being bound by the reality/fact-based consensus and so doomed to fall before the ones creating the paradigms and realities as they went along. Maliki and Cheney seems, to me, firmly entrenched in this reality-view still.
And a OT plug again: Has there been any official US response to the massive insurgent/terrorist victory in the Nepalese elections? From a COIN perspective, is there any serious study of that conflict available online?
Soldier, since you read the arabic press you probably saw this already, but it appears Maliki & the US commander in Baghdad confirmed this is a take-down strategy against the JAM: "Sons of Iraq"-style councils in Sadr City (via al-Hayat)-- http://www.daralhayat.com/arab_news/levant_news/04-2008/Item-20080415-5373ae28-c0a8-10ed-01e2-5c73997086e5/story.html
an initial thought:
the "gradualist approach" as a fall-back position after the military failure in Basra and after some of the greener troops in the Sadr City op pull back? (on that last one, see the NYTimes from a couple of days ago)
soldier: what you'd quoted about Dawa & ISCI pulling closer together reminds me of a question rattling around in my brain, in dialog with the description of Iraq before the Basra operation as having achieved a kind of political and military equilibrium,* which undergirded the ceasefires and perhaps supported Maliki's attempts to build an independent power base for himself in the central gov't & the army. What would have pushed Maliki into the arms of ISCI so quickly, and what deals were done in the process?
I think Soldier is on to something when he ID's the Basra op as originating with ISCI's goals (a southern federal region for them), rather than Dawa's more nationalist aims.
*See Steven Biddle's testimony to Congress the day before Petraeus ran his show (AbuM posted about it; the link should be somewhere in the archives here)
The Iraqi army didn't engage in failure! Even better! Both Chalabi and Allawi are well. And, living in Iraq. And, the diplomats also came together. According to IRAQ THE MODEL, they've even passed legislation. Not perfect.
But Maliki isn't the only show in town, now. Over these years both Chalabi and Allawi are players. Yet they're hidden from view. journalists don't report these things.
The NY Times is dying, instead.
And, the blogs are where people go, to find out what's happening.
Sadr, like Nasrallah, are both hiding out in Tehran. While Sadr's 2nd in command got killed.
AND, a wall is going up in Basra, that divides the portion the terrorists have been using. The WALL is locking them in. And, reducing their ability to fire out onto the green zone. Or to move about.
The Iraqis are an independent people. They do not want to be controlled by the Saud's! Nor, do they even like the Persians. Who are not arabs. So, if you think the Iranians are in, you're just being foolish.
Diplomatically speaking? Putin is divorcing his old wife, to marry a 24 year old. Shinanigans keep the diplomats busy, anyway.
"a fiasco that dragged U.S. forces into the fray and brought Iraq to the brink of an intra-Shia civil war"
Wha? You must be in a different Al Basrah than I am... How is the JAM doing 'bout now?
I expect this kind of stuff in the NYT, not here.
Well, back to work watching the ISF clean out another area, er...engage in a fiasco. Whichever.
Mmm...as a "conservative blogger" I am aware of and wrote extensively on the relationships of the Sadr and Badr/SCIRI/SIIC, whatever they call themselves these days, with each other and Iran.
In fact, aside from the "UN Mandate" that everyone likes to quote about why we didn't finish ol' Saddam off in '91 and why we left the Shia hanging in the breeze, I do believe that the reason we really hesitated was because our Saudi allies were afraid of just that fact: the Iraqi Shia's were influenced and infiltrated by the Iranians; they were afraid that this exact thing would happen. To wit, an Iranian friendly government would be installed in Iraq.
On the other hand, I tend to look at it as "glass half full". In fact, an Iranian friendly Iraqi government that is also friendly to the US would make (and has) a very nice go between where both nations have something invested. If, of course, we can get past the point where Iran fears a stable, democratic Iraq and they stop working to keep unstable, we could move on.
I might also add, horrible neo-con that I am, that the fear of a Shia "crescent" or new caliphate (that rivals the hoped for Salafist Wahhabi caliphate) is a nice balance and place for these groups and their nominal backers to focus on, instead of the west.
Near enemy. Far enemy.
On the other hand, sadly, I believe that the Iranian Shia Islamic Revolution in Iran was the start of the latest (last thirty years) round of Saudi backed Wahhabi expansion to counter the feared spread of the revolution.
Thus, we are in a conundrum where, in the background, there is the potential that a democratic Iraq could act as a low level "insurgency" against these other two aspects of the struggle in the ME while simultaneously, at this moment, possibly increasing the friction.
At this point, the crystal ball goes foggy.
But, back to a question from Dr. iRak, what else could have prompted the immediate actions of the Maliki government against Sadr?
Well, I think there were several items to be addressed. First, at the beginning of the year, they were trying to put the provincial elections process in place. ostensibly, to satisfy the needs to include Sunni's in government that had previously boycotted. Sealing the gains there. In the lead up to that, Sadr had twice pulled out of the Maliki government in an attempt to weaken it and bolster its own position for potential provincial elections as well as a hoped for collapse of parliament due to "lack of confidence". Sadr said several times that he believed he had enough support on the ground to take a bigger chunk than what had been offered to him after the last election (30 seats, cabinet positions and ministries).
During the discussions regarding provincial elections, Sadr withdrew stating that there were not enough "protections" for minority parties (read, not enough seats offered in a unified party - UIA - situation to satisfy his belief in his power on the ground or in his belief that he could, if "fair", win a majority position in provincial government through elections).
Parliament went on to pass the laws to govern provincial elections. Sadr has to fear these elections because the SCIRI/DAWA movement supports utilization of the "semi-autonomous region" law that allows three or more provinces to ratify a kind of "statehood".
Sadr opposes this on the principle of a "unified Iraq" which he believes should exist with a majority Shia government. He believes, to some degree, that the federalization of Iraq might lead to the possibility of a break up of the Shia's into regional powers or parties that would be more interested in their own power and provide an open window to others (read Sunni/Ba'ath) coming back to power in the central government. Ruling, once again, the Shia. (I think this is largely paranoia, but its one of the main principles of his party).
He also fears his own marginalization. Regardless of his infiltration in these southern areas, I don't believe that he has as much confidence in any type of majority in the south that would allow his party, in a regional match up, to gain any significant power. Further, it would be separated from his power base around Sadr City and places in Najaf and Karbala. But, particularly the Sadr City constituency which is, by dent of its location, within a very diverse region with Sunni "moderates", Islamists, secularists and ex-Ba'athists. I believe he knows that the needs and demands of the Shia in these areas would be at the mercy of any SCIRI/DAWA compromises with these various groups in parliament to consolidate their own power and economy in the south.
I believe this is also the reason that his Shia militias have attempted to "cleanse" areas in Baghdad and surrounding areas from Sunnis. Not just physical security, but political.
Maliki, for his part, probably believes he is in the stronger position, having survived several Sadrist attempts to collapse or control the government. He also needs to consolidate support from other groups, both the Shia in the south under SCIRI/DAWA and the Sunni in the west. Both of which wanted the provincial elections laws passed. One he needed to pull in (Sunni) to improve security (and keep our support) and the other he needed to keep behind him to keep his government going.
Sadr, at this point, is playing "dog in the manger".
Maliki may, indeed, have over estimated the capabilities of his forces. He is stuck in the green zone most of the time and reliant on reports from both his own military advisers and US military. Plus, he has no real knowledge of or experience of being "commander in chief". I do believe he over estimated his abilities while at the same time may have been equally influenced by the need to "do something now."
There is a second "right now" that is an imperative. In order to bring Iraq forward, consolidate the security gains and tamp down the reasons for the general unrest among the population that provides a base for AQIZ and other insurgents, Iraq needs to do massive reconstruction of its infrastructure and develop a broader economic base to improve over all conditions for the population.
In order to do that, they need two very important things: 1) loans to the central government; 2) foreign investment.
Even though Iraq has something like 9 billion sitting in foreign banks as "collateral", its over all condition and economic forecast is shakily moving forward. But, the instability of continuing insurgency as well as the general view of corruption and crime permeating federal and provincial governments, makes loans from the IMF and other countries extremely high risk (read, not forth coming).
Not to mention, many countries attempting to keep Iraq from becoming too economically and politically powerful with its huge oil and gas reserves, have been reluctant to reduce any further debts that Iraq incurred under Saddam's regime.
Iraq needs to build its cash reserves and financial viability as well as have the funds to continue to build its infrastructure and security apparatus. To do that, they need to get much more private investment to build or reconstruct their oil and natural gas capacity.
To do that, they need two things: the hydro-carbon law and security around the areas where their major reserves, infrastructure and transport (roads, railroads and pipelines) is; namely in the south, around and through Basrah and Um Qasr.
Sadr, JAM and various criminal gangs nominally under the auspices of Sadr/JAM, stand in the way of both the law and the security.
Frankly, these oil companies are going to be reluctant to put a lot of money into these areas and infrastructure when they don't know exactly what their share of the profit is going to be (hydro-carbon laws) and when the need to keep repairing equipment and pipelines, securing deliveries from theft and skimming and paying out large sums for "protection" money or insure the loyalty of those Iraqis responsible for operating or delivering the goods is going to eat up a bunch of their profit (the long term percentage of which is in limbo).
Iraq is currently producing between 2 and 2.6 million bpds. Their conservative projections, under optimal conditions with all necessary investment, is that they can produce 6 million bpds within 10 years. Optimist projections put it at 10 million with the potential to develop fields in Anbar and the north. Even an increase of 500k to 1 million bpds in the current market would go a long way towards building Iraq's cash reserves, credit and cash on hand for immediate reconstruction needs. A guarantee of this production and revenue would go a long way towards influencing investment and loans.
Now, if anyone is watching, the Iraqis have gone ahead with several aspects of this program. First, they have went ahead with an interim provincial profit sharing scheme in their current budget. This is meant to pacify the larger body politic while the central government moves forward with contracts and development. Second, they have begun certifying companies to bid on these potential contracts. Third, they have already signed several service contracts with with several international companies, such as Total with a potential for Chevron and Exxon. Fourth, they are holding a huge "energy" conference in the middle of May down in Dubai where they will be discussing laws, contracts, potential and issues. This is to further their relations and develop more contacts for the investment and selling of this energy production (part of the conference is dedicated to developing Iraq's largely untapped or wasted natural gas resources).
A three part series on who controls what in Basrah province:
http://www.thedonovan.com/archives/2008/04/iraq_economy_ba_2.html
And a long analysis on the Badr/SCIRI v. Sadr movement:
http://themiddleground.blogspot.com/2007/08/sitrep-iraq-sadr-badr-oil-and.html
In brief, SCIRI/BADR/DAWA owns the reins of government and controls much of the reconstruction and service money from the central government. They get much of their money through graft, embezzlement and other corruption along with criminal activities surrounding smuggling of all types of goods, oil and gas.
Sadr infiltrated the security forces, labor unions and poor neighborhoods. He doesn't have SCIRI's money or governing power, but he has some power on the streets along with a vast array of criminal undertakings again surrounding oil and gas.
Knocking off or down Sadr and any "outlaw" gangs would go a long way towards securing the resources in the south and re-assuring any potential investors/business developers.
There is a third imperative, the "right now" of upcoming elections in the United States where Iraq cannot be sure of the outcome or whether we will continue to support them in any meaningful way. Maliki needs the security to be much better in case we do get crazy and call for a rapid draw down. He needs to be in a much stronger position. Even if McCain gets in office, he'll have to show some serious improvements in order to give the next president cover if they decide to stay.
After all that, I would caution about giving too much credence or power to the Iranian side of this discussion. It is there and it is real, but there are many equally national Iraqi interests at play.
Alrighty, I've visited here before (you are linked through instapundit) and have found the commentary, like most of the information on Irack, confusing at best and byzantine at worst.
It's been a few weeks now, and the situation in Basra still seems to be a source of conflicting reports. Dr. Irack calls it a fiasco, Major John ( I believe I've read emails on instapundit from the same person) is actually in Basra atm with the ISF. His assessment of the situation is decidedly different.
The Iranians are everywhere, and every Iraqi seems to be aligned with them. Yet even the Iranians don't seem to like the Iranians, unless all current reports from inside that country are completely wrong.
The IA and ISF apparently contained outbreaks everywhere except in Basra. Of course, there aren't reports in detail in our press, so maybe there were more IA defections?
Currently, the IA/ISF is clearing Sadr City, unless again these reports are inaccurate.
Finally, if the Jam had infiltrated the ISF/IA and had advance warning of Maliki's plans, why would they go to the matressess over an attempt by Maliki to disrupt the rogue elements that Sadr apparently does not want in Jam anyhow?
As usual, the explanation is more confusing then the original question.
Reading over at Bill Roggio's Long War Journal has helped to tease out some of the details: there was a major uprooting of Qods supply/organized crime cells between Basrah and Baghdad which takes out the replacements for the old Kazali network uprooted last year. This puts a serious pinch on Sadr City as its resupply for fighters must now come from the north and direct east, which are not the best of all possible routes to smuggle supplies in.
Looking at the operation by the IA/ISF/IP/NP at the time, I was interested to see the large amount of green forces going into Basrah (although with an element of the 9AD which is something overlooked). There were multiple ways to view it, but hadn't thought of it in the one that presents itself after reading Dr. iRack's work: a 'show of force' to presage a larger push, later, that the enemy would not countenance. Setting up a staging area and cleaning out immediate attackers and setting up a local HQ in Basrah for the operation would require confrontation with the outlying elements of JaM and Qods. It is not, perhaps, beyond speculation that JaM, in particular, wanted no 'show of force' around Basrah and resisted it in an increasing, step-wise manner that escalated in less than a day from a simple 'knock on the doors to find the bad guys' to house-to-house gunfights. For all the fact that both 10ID and 14ID were undermanned and the 14th just recently out of training, a bit of 'seasoning operation' to loosen everyone up and give them a taste of what is to come turned into something other.
I did wonder about the JaM end-strength and still *do*. While lower, population based estimates are wrong, they cannot be at the vaunted '60,000' that is bandied about,either: the total contact of JaM and Qods from Basrah to Baghdad's Sadr City is encompassing far less than 60,000 but includes logistics personell. Even shoestring terrorist groups need *some* logistics safety and JaM appeared to be following the Hezbollah model for that to concentrate on fighters and not on training or understanding of emplacement, logistics or transport. For the second time in a year, Sadr has lost his logistics base and this time it was manned by Qods trained personnel.
The continued work has been COIN in Basrah (clear, hold, sustain, build, get local involvement) and similarly along the riverine routes from there and overland between the rivers. The 10ID was suited for that, being a base building organization for training, and the lighter fighting along that route was probably expected in removing attackers in Basrah.
Now it is Sadr City that is being encircled and cut-off and Basrah that is being cleaned on a neighborhood by neighborhood basis. Whatever the operation started out as, it has become a full COIN push against Sadr, organized crime groups supporting insurgents and Qods.
Almost all of the *veteran* units in the IA are up north. AQI has yet to find a way to stop those units and they have shown less ingenuity as time has gone on. Recent reports have them running out of logistics and money... they can *try* to hold someplace, but a stationary defense is not a good answer in the modern, COIN field. Tends to get a GPS guided munition at unexpected moments...
jacksonian,
Thanks for that post. The logistical aspect of the JAM militia is something which a lot of us lay people overlook.
However, quoting Roggio here appears to be a non-starter.;)
Again from the laymans standpoint, it would seem that the force that's left in the field, still conducting searches and arrests in the other guys home turf has carried the day. I'll await someone to point out the fallacy of that particular belief.
And to soldiernolongeriniraq, I understand the concern that Iran brokered the piece, but fail to see the relevence vis a vis the MNF NOT doing so.
We are not in JAM's supply chain, so I cannot get around why he would aquiesce to any efforts we would make to end any Shia on Shia violence.
Other things that make you go hmmmm...
Dr. iRack is positing that the initial aim of the operation from Maliki's side was taking out special groups aligned with Iran.
Whom SNLII posits is aligned with Maliki(iRan, that is).
Which precipitates a wider conflict (fiasco, I believe it's become) leading to the IA/ISF controlling Basra (after a peace is brokered by iRan )and conducting raids and arresting.....who? The Special group guys?
I'll grant you that iRan is a player, however what strategic sense does it make for them to allow Maliki to roll up their assests in Basra?
And, gian, do you believe what you posted is actually possible? That the senior folks in iRack do not understand warfare?
It's interesting that despite defeating the Sadrists militarily and getting them off the streets, the press calls it a "fiasco" because everything didn't go exactly as planned. I can only imagine what catastrophes the successful-but-poorly-executed assaults on Iwo Jima and Normandy would have been as reported by this press.
Clearly all this was a much bigger problem for Sadr than for Maliki. Not only did the Sadrists get routed in Basra, Umm Qasr, Kut, Najaf, Hillah, Amarah, and Diwaniyah, but they are under pressure in their stronghold of Sadr City and politically almost every party has lined up behind Maliki against him, pasing laws that will not allow him to stand for elections unless he disbands his violent militia. To add further insult to injury, Al Sistani has said militias need to follow the law.
If this is a "fiasco," let us hope for a thousand more fiascos.
Meanwhile, in Basra residents are celebrating as music shops are opening up, as the "dark ages" of Sadrist thuggery come to an end.
....so, who the Heck won in Basra?
Hmmm, JAM has demanded an immediate stop to hostilities or all out war will commence, my tv tells me this morning. Hmmm indeed.
Yes, Jam has said that.
And iRan has condemned them as outlaws, and their ambassador supports Malikis actions against them. (while pissing on the US in Sadr city. Gee, couldn't see that coming...)
Even the NYT is calling Sadr's status unknown, with a strong bias towards marginalized.
Who knows? Let's ask Major John for an update...
fascinating that cointel folks do not recognize the practice Mao taught long ago:
“The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue”
Wow. And what if the Iranians in Basra were actually hostile to the Iranians in Tehran and in an attempt to provoke Iraq into a fight to draw the U.S. into an attack on Iran where the Iranians in Basra could then become the Iranians in Tehran ... Things that make you go hmmm...
Damn, this fiasco is spiraling out of control...
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article3671861.ece
Okay, you've been countered by a guy actually there and let the post sit without response.
Why is that?
The Sun sums up Gordon Brown's visit to Iraq and announcement that Basra is to be put into Iraqi control with the words: "Happy Christmas - War is over".
The Daily Telegraph is not so sure, saying it thinks the prime minister was just hinting at an end to British involvement in Iraq.
The Times points out Mr Brown believes economic development is key for Iraq.
But it reports some Iraqis fear Basra has fallen victim to lawless gangs and an "Iranian-inspired morality police".
Afghan army test
Britain's role in fighting the Taleban for control of the Afghan town Musa Qala is also examined by the Times.
Success there would be of symbolic importance as it is the only Afghan town undeniably under Islamist control, writes the paper's Bronwen Maddox.
The Telegraph says the Afghan army claims it has captured two Taleban commanders trying to escape the town.
The battle is the first major test of the Nato-trained Afghan army, according to the Guardian.
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