How to beat an insurgency...
Abu Muqawama mentioned the excellent briefing on Colombia and the FARC presented by Colombian Vice-Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón last weekend. Embarrassingly for a student of counter-insurgency, Abu Muqawama knows little about the FARC. Having said that, it appears as if Colombia is really kicking the snot out of them these days. Colombian officials are clear and unashamed about one thing: steady and generous U.S. aid has been critical to their success.
(Civilians? Those weren't civilians -- surely those were insurgent potentialities.)In a country where most people cannot remember a time of peace, Colombians are for the first time raising the possibility that a guerrilla group once thought invincible could be forced into peace negotiations or even defeated militarily.
Weakened by infiltrators and facing constant combat and aerial bombardment, the insurgency is losing members in record numbers. The FARC, as the group is known, lost 1,583 fighters in combat last year, its columns are plagued by command-and-control problems, and popular support is evaporating, the government of President Álvaro Uribe says.
Since 2000, the Uribe administration has received $5 billion in U.S. aid, mostly for military and anti-drug programs -- more than any other government outside the Middle East. The money has helped it revamp the Colombian army, paying for new helicopters and training for elite troops, although rights groups remain concerned about abuses, including the killings of civilians.
Update: Charlie recommends...
12 comments:
Fortunately for AM, I used to do a lot of work on Colombia.
For a great assessment of FARC in the 1990s, check out Peter Chalk and Angel Rabasa's RAND report "Colombian Labyrinth." It's a detailed analysis of how FARC benefited from the collapse of the cartels and translated that windfall into a near-conventional maneuver capability. Wicked good.
And if you read French, take a look on François DURAN's blog (théâtre des opérations) for several posts on this issue (François often goes to Colombia for his work).
(reflexionstrategique.blogspot.com/#_ftn1)
Additionally, you could write him an e-mail because he is very fluent in English.
:)
Stéphane TAILLAT
Note: small number of advisors from 7th SFG(A); long-term engagement; beneath the radar. A lot like El Salvador. Does this argue, perhaps, against the 20K Advisory Corps?
Anon--good question. I think what it suggests is that we can get a lot more bang for our buck with small, focused teams. Colombia and the Philippines are great examples.
But SF isn't big enough for the missions in Iraq and Afg, nor is advising brigade or MOD staff among their core skills.
Maybe the lesson should be that it's a real pain in the ass to build armies and ministries from the ground up at the same time.
Well said, Charlie - but a thought for consideration: after Iraq, will we be building an partner Army from the ground up? And SF is increasing 3-5% per year; senior BDE level officers can attend ILE; and SF LTCs can advise BDE level staffs.
So: do we want 20K dudes hanging out at Ft. Knox waiting for the overthrow of NK?
Not sure how this plays out - so trying to think my way thru this and would love to get your take...
Anon--you're right, we need to think this all the way through. I'll admit to being a bit more sanguine on the Advisor Corps than my blogmates.
I see two problems with relying on SF in the next 5 years: 1) they've really focused more on direct action than FID and I don't see that changing. 2) We're going to be in Iraq and Afg for a long time; we can't design an "advising" strategy that doesn't fully account for the personnel demands present there.
And SF LTCs certainly do advise brigades, but designing payroll and logistics systems isn't really their forte.
"So: do we want 20K dudes hanging out at Ft. Knox waiting for the overthrow of NK?"
How about a unit dedicated to coin with a hard core of active troops (up to one brigade) and additional dedicated reserve units.
Regarding the resere units:
Use retired SFs and officers and clever ncos with coin experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Pay them money to learn some potentially relevant languages as civilians.
Next step: college level studies of sociology, relevant languages etc - maybe a special school attached to one of the service academies that also offers coin classes for cadets?
Last step: additional studies for the brightest of them, transforming them into the armys new human terrain teams ...
Just random thoughts, no idea whether it might work ...
What I like best about the idea of using reserves, though: As far as coin is concerned, older and more experienced people should do better than 20 year olds when acting as embedded trainers for foreing soldiers and cops (they will get more respect). Also, they should have lots of civilian experience (as cops, engineers etc) that might be applied to coin operations.
Your first comment - about the active BDE force a knee-jerk response ("uh, we have those already: Special Forces Groups..."). But your follow on thoughts are superb - and merit more consideration.
Does this argue, perhaps, against the 20K Advisory Corps?
Not unless they are combat veterans that speak Spanish and know the culture. They would also need a leadership that had years and years of experience, which is not what you get with the Advisory Corp
FARC has been an interesting organization to examine as they have been cited as having ties in the training realm to groups like ETA, IRA, PLO and Hezbollah. Part of the problem was presented in 2000 by Frank J. Cilluffo from CSIS and from Ralf Mutschke Assistant Director, CID, Interpol on the connections between organized crime and transnational terrorism. Mr. Cilluffo classifies FARC as being a narco-state, due to the size it held on to then, and called it 'FARCLANDIA'. Both men indicate the pattern of increasing ties (circa 2000) between the Red Mafia, Albanian organized crime, the waning drug cartels and ascendant kingpins in S. America, and the problem of the crossing of economic ties between them. When 20 some tons of Colombian cocaine shows up in St. Petersburg, you know you have a problem on your hands.
Part of the powering of the drug gangs in Mexico has come directly from FARC as seen by a 2003 Report by the Library of Congress on the issue of rising violence in Mexico. The older cartel system in Mexico was seen as being replaced by "a half-dozen smaller, corporate style, trafficking networks." Worse is that training from FARC was being done on COINTEL so as to help obfuscate transnational connections and money transactions. It is that sort of training, beyond weapons and explosives of the early PLO/IRA/ETA sort that clearly marks a difference in the sophistication of FARC from other organizations.
That sophistication, itself, is garnered from external agencies coming into help FARC and other groups in S. America. This was started off during the Menem regime in Argentina and its connections to Syria via the international arms dealer Monzer al-Kassar (that link heading to a 2005 IPIS report). This was not an unknown connection as, again, in 2000 a Middle East Intelligence Bulletin looked at the arms deals that had gone on in Argentina and the importation of one figure we have heard a bit about in JAN 2008: Imad Mugniyah. Monzer al-Kassar, himself, was linked to arms deals with FARC in the late 1990's and was picked up in Spain in 2007 when the US issued an extradition order for him based on a 'sting' operation involving a FARC purchase request for SAMs, explosives and such. Syria, itself, has started to threaten Syria, Iraq and the US if al-Kassar is not handed back to them. al-Kassar himself is linked to multiple transfers of illegal arms to places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia, with arms originating from Argentina, Poland, Lithuania and Germany. It is during that period of the mid to late-1990's that FARC saw a definitive uptick in its COINTEL and training capacity along with its first major ties to the Albanian and Russian Mafias.
The US has been paying a fair amount in Columbia for years, long years, to try and roll-back FARC and undercut its despotic ways over the farmers in regions it controls. As a putative 'leftist' terror organization, although now more a narco-terror organization with delusions of leftism, FARC has sought help from Congress after trying to assassinate a sitting President of the US in 2000. Mind you that was a President with a (D) after his name.
Although FARC has been one of the major keys in transnational terrorism, having virtual control over a good part of Colombia, its influence has not been what it once was. The recent influx of cash and geographic support from Venezuela is threatening to destabilize that region as both Colombia and Ecuador have major grievances against FARC and its various assassination campaigns over the years. The multifaceted COIN work of not only military, but agricultural, diplomatic, economic vectors are all playing their role, but the differences in culture, terrain and the long standing of FARC is making it a much harder place to fight it than Abu Sayyaff in the Philippines, say. Or the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The flexibility of FARC is not to be discounted until the last camp is shut down and the majority of operatives found and the entire set of accounts and contacts swept up. That, unfortunately, will take years to do via law enforcement and some countries will not look too highly on the US, Colombia or anyone else going against some of the individuals involved. It is a 40 year laundry list and it is guaranteed to be anything but short.
"What I like best about the idea of using reserves, though: As far as coin is concerned, older and more experienced people should do better than 20 year olds when acting as embedded trainers for foreing soldiers and cops (they will get more respect)."
This repeats the Civil Affairs nightmare scenario. The CA skillset was stop lossed by President Clinton in 1995...last I checked...they were still stoplossed.
Training teams for other countries Armies don't need to be particularly large. For most cases they need to function more as "Outside Consultants" like many large corporations employ.
The basic assumption is that the host country has the ability to duplicate processes and procedures. Almost everything done in most large organizations is done the way it is being done because they have always done it that way.
In the Philipines or Columbian examples..to simplify..we made recommendations to change their processes and procedures..assisted in setting up the "Model Battalion"..hung around long enough for all the other battalion commanders to conclude that the new model was better than the old model..and let them get on with the process of duplicating.
Iraq is an exception to the model..as there was no duplicating capacity as there was no mid-level NCO/Officer Corp.
After a quick scan of the Preface to Columbian Labyrinth recommended by Charlie, I note that "research was concluded in September 2001", and that much of what has since occurred tracks pretty closely with its recommendations as summarized in the Preface.
Post a Comment