COL Peter Mansoor Weighs in on Gentile and the Surge
Real quick: check out COL Peter Mansoor's response to LTC Gentile over at SWJ. More commentary here later in the weekend. Until then, check out Kip's comments on Gentile's views of the 2006 war in Lebanon, and AM's thoughts on his criticisms of 3-24 and 3-0. Charlie continues at parade rest awaiting his competing COIN strategy.
Gentile worries that the U.S. Army has lost the capability to conduct conventional warfighting operations. I disagree. The Army has not lost that capability; today's Army is the most experienced, professional, and capable combined arms force in our nation's history. Since 2003 the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have routinely engaged in conventional warfighting. Battles in Karbala, An Najaf, Fallujah, Tal Afar, Mosul, Baqubah, Baghdad, and elsewhere have proven the capabilities of our ground forces to engage in conventional combat operations. Combat units routinely use armor, artillery, mechanized infantry, attack aviation, close air support, and other assets to accomplish their missions. The fact that our units are doing non-kinetic operations doesn't mean they've stopped doing high-intensity kinetic operations or have forgotten how. Gentile also doesn't mention how much more capable our brigades are now in terms of command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance than they were when the war began in 2003.
The larger concern, in my view, would be if our senior leaders allow our newly developed counterinsurgency capabilities to lapse, and like Gentile, focus instead on preparing the Army to fight the next “big one." After all, why worry about fighting real wars in the Middle East and South Asia when we can instead keep our military forces in the United States to fight imaginary ones? Iraq and Afghanistan are a long way from being over. To paraphrase a certain high ranking former official, let’s fight the wars we have, rather than the ones we want.
7 comments:
If you can do small wars right, you can do big wars right. Mao* wrote it down, Chesty Puller proved it. As do our soldiers everyday...and will in the future.**
As far as small vs big wars...I think both LTC's have valid points, certainly if we had no heavy units or artillery LTC Gentile's worst fears would be realized?
But is anyone seriously advocating a single, monolithic approach? In the Army anyway...
*One of the reasons the Chinese put such a hurting on us in 1950 was that captured ID papers on some of their soliders revealed they had been fighting since the 1930's. The shoe (for now) is somewhat on the other foot.
**assuming they have a budget. That our Army doesn't is what we should be yelling about. If you haven't lived in the fund ops out of the OMA budget (the 90's) it means little or no training until you are 3 mos out from deployment. Does not a happy soldier or leader make.
I think there is something to be said for training for conventional operations. There hasn't been a real USMC CAX in 29 Palms since February 2004 (I was there). Can Marines conduct a Call-For-Fire? Sure. But do the Bn staffs know how to do fire support planning--I would argue that they don't. There is a whole generation of officers servine in the Marines who have never stepped aboard ship. Gen Conway is right about us becoming less expeditionary, as deployment currently consists of, as he says, "a cot and three squares a day." Few staffs have worked with a real MAGTF.
(before Charlie throws a chair at me, I agree that the Commandant uses a selective reading of history that ignores Small Wars and views the Marines as merely an assault force.) The General does have a point, though.
I fear the Marines might have to dig up the findings from the Culebra Maneuvers to figure out how to live and operate from Ships.
This stuff is perishable. I remember a Captain coming in to talk to my OCS Company. He talked about Small Wars, and how (not) to train for them: He said that if we would train for High-Intensity operations, we could just throttle-back to Low Intensity Ops. He was wrong. Now some saying the exact opposite, and that's not correct either. I'm not at the point where I'm agreeing with Gentile yet--there is still too much to learn on the Small Wars side. But we do need to realize that we're doing some Small Wars training at the expense of learning more conventional combat.
(Elf2006--Citing Mao is somewhat unfair, because one stage of his model of Small Wars is "Maneuver Combat", which is the same as "conventional operations." Implied in that model of small wars is training for conventional combat, which is why the Chinese were such adepts at rural organization AND unit-vs-unit fighting.)
Smitten Eagle--I think you're right on all counts. There's currently a gap in conventional training, and that gap creates risks.
The question is what is the acceptable level of risk given that we're currently fighting two irregular wars? Gen Conway does have a point regarding amphibs (he just makes it poorly). The question is what to do about it?
I'm not inclined to tell a 1st Lt or E-3 that we canceled their pre-deployment Mojave Viper run-thru so they could spend 2 weeks at sea...
Speaking as an amateur... Could I suggest that the underlying problem is that some officers are worried that COIN doctrine would suggest that you don't really need a US Army that has all the expensive modern, mechanized gear?
You definitely don't need TWO armies (the US Army and the USMC).
The USMC can apparently do everything that the Army can, but - after the invasion - you don't need the US Army in its current form. You need something like a larger version of the Italian Carabinieri: a VERY strong Military Police, with (perhaps) a few light tanks and some heavy artillery. Oh... and LOTS of Engineers, Medics and other people who put things together rather than blow them up.
Perhaps I'm being cynical, but that seems to be what the Colonels are worried about. They don't want to see the US Army become like British Army in the the 19th Century: a Colonial Police/Construction Force
Smitten Eagle..I agree on Mao...that is what he said..but that was the final stage, yes? You had to build to it..starting with guerrilla/light infantry.
The British Army hardly suffered for their 19th century experience..it's just that they began WWI way too small. Well...budgets affect everyone.
I certainly wouldn't advocate an all light/COIN force..hell we need tanks and artillery for what we are doing now.
I don't know what it is about the military that's it's senior people become such partisans of "this is the only way". Maybe it's the war to the knife over budgets.
smitten eagle,
CAX (I was there in Feb 04 too, in orange) has morphed into Mojave Viper, which includes two weeks of intense COIN training, but begins with two weeks of live-fire combined arms training: R410A, R400, Motorized Operations, and the Deliberate Assault Course (a MAC-FINEX hybrid in a Bint Jbail-type scenario). The battalion staff and company commander and FiST have to demonstrate competence with the basics of combined arms.
The Coyotes' view (adopted by Gen Mattis at TECOM) is that combined arms is a Marine Corps core competency and needs to be practiced, even for units heading for COIN.
Two of my platoon commander compadres, now battalion commanders in Iraq, beat their company commanders back down when they complained about having to do combined arms.
It will take some work to relearn amphibious operations, but it appears the plan is to return one regiment on east coast to MEU status, allowing corporate knowledge to build up faster, the way we did in the late 80s and early 90s when 1st and 8th Marines had the MEU (SOC) mission.
We will need to find a way to balance the demands of full spectrum operations, if not, we will have to abandon Afghanistan and Iraq, but then we could build the FCS!!
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