Wednesday, January 9, 2008

Rogers vs. Gentile in Armed Forces Journal

A few days ago, Abu Muqawama received over e-mail the proofs for the new edition of Armed Forces Journal. There is some good stuff in this latest issue, including a thoughtful essay by MAJ Daniel Davis on the continued (ir)relevance of net-centric warfare. He writes:

...given the current state of technology, the probability of future development in nations across the globe, and a historical perspective on the performance of new and emerging technologies in the past, does this theory stand up to rigorous examination? I argue that it does not. Aside from a near-faith-based, unsubstantiated belief in the efficacy of technology to do anything and everything imaginable, one of the primary factors upon which this assessment is based is its failure to give proper consideration to the capabilities of the future enemy force.

Davis then goes on to talk about tanks and planes and all kinds of expensive weapons systems that Abu Muqawama freely admits he has no experience with. But for those of you who like reading this blog for defense issues not related to counterinsurgency -- who the hell are you? -- this article will be thought-provoking.

For the rest of us, the real treat in this issue of AFJ is the debate between MAJ Chris Rogers and LTC Gian Gentile on the new counterinsurgency doctrine. Gentile has a big problem with the new counterinsurgency doctrine. In a previous, controversial essay for AFJ, he wrote:

The eminent scholar and strategic thinker Eliot Cohen noted that counterinsurgency war is still war, and war in its essence is fighting. In trying to teach its readers to eat soup with a knife, the COIN manual discards the essence and reality of counterinsurgency warfare fighting, thereby manifesting its tragic flaw. ... War is not clean and precise; it is blunt and violent and dirty because, at its essence, it is fighting, and fighting causes misery and death. The authors of the Army’s 1986 AirLand Battle doctrine premised their manual on fighting as the essence of war. Fighting gave the 1986 manual a coherence that reflected the true nature of war. The Army’s new COIN manual’s tragic flaw is that the essence of war fighting is missing from its pages.

Basically, Gian Gentile thinks the new COIN manual leaves the enemy out of the equation, a dangerous thing to do when thinking about, you know, stuff like war. War, for Gentile, is fighting. And if you describe a kind of war without violence, you're just going to go and confuse the American Soldier. In the latest issue of AFJ, Gentile refines his message:

...the predisposition to focus exclusively on ourselves and our doctrine leads us potentially to violate the guidance of one of the oldest philosophers of war, Sun Tzu, to know oneself and the enemy and the environment, too. Our doctrine directs us to believe that in a counterinsurgency war, the people are the center of gravity. In this theory, the enemy is removed from the essence of war and placed at the fringes. Then, within this so-called war devoid of an enemy, applied scientific processes align the people to their government. Because the enemy is removed as the central element in war, the element of friction in war is gone, too.

Gentile is especially put off by the admonition found in FM 3-24 (the new COIN manual) that "tactics mean nothing." (The manual doesn't actually say this, so this is a straw man. The manual says that tactical success guarantees nothing. Which is not to say that tactics are not important. It's just saying that good tactics are not the "end state" here.) Rogers gamely addresses this claim, though:

The salient point from this paradox is not that tactics mean nothing — it is that tactics must be employed as part of a larger design aimed at achieving strategic goals.

Now, you guys can all read these articles yourselves, but in Abu Muqawama's opinion, Rogers gets the better of Gentile mainly because Rogers has the advantage of being right. Gentile, apparently, thinks FM 3-24 seeks to push the Army and Marine Corps into some crazy post-Clausewitzian era. But Gentile -- for whom Abu Muqawama has a lot of respect -- takes this to mean we have moved past the "era of battles and wars of decision." Abu Muqawama -- who may be silly and ignorant but has read his Clausewitz -- sees FM 3-24 actually pushing the Army and Marine Corps closer to Clausewitz.

The essence of war is not to fight and kill the enemy. The essence of war is to achieve political aims through the application of force. Everything an army does must be subservient to the overall political objective. War seen as the destruction of the enemy's fighting force is some kind of alternate, Jominian concept. Sometimes you "fight" by applying violence to (read: shooting and bombing) the enemy's fighting force, sure. Sometimes you "fight" by merely threatening the enemy. But however you do battle, the single most important thing is the political aim you wish to achieve. Nothing else -- neither body counts nor seized cities nor sunken battleships -- takes precedence over the political aim.

In a U.S. Army operations order, the single most important thing is the commander's intent. If you forget everything else, soldiers are told, remember the commander's intent and work toward that goal. Abu Muqawama is sorry if someone told Gian Gentile and his soldiers that killing the enemy was their job, but it's not -- at least not necessarily. Accomplishing the stated political aims of the American political leadership through the application of force is their job, and that may or may not mean shooting bad guys. To remind soldiers of that -- even if it means shattering the illusion that war necessarily means lots of killing -- is no bad thing.

16 comments:

John Gardner said...

“The single most important thing is the political aim you wish to achieve. Nothing else -- neither body counts nor seized cities nor sunken battleships -- takes precedence over the political aim.”

“Abu Muqawama -- who may be silly and ignorant but has read his Clausewitz -- sees FM 3-24 actually pushing the Army and Marine Corps closer to Clausewitz.”

Adapt or die we used to say. That is the militaries way and while the military may not have adapted fast enough for some at least it has adapted. Some focus needs to be placed on pushing/adapting the Civilian/Political apparatus that creates theses political aims into the real world. They seem to be absent or completely cordoned off. My perception is that we have Captains, Majors and Colonels sitting on political councils in Iraq, Afghanistan and wherever else. While we should have long ago had a huge ramp up of Dept of State/OGA assets dealing with civilian political/infrastructure issues allowing the Military to focus more on the kinetic end of things.

I just think there should be fewer Marines cleaning streets the Iraqis should be convinced it is in their best interest to clean themselves. Over simple yes but isn’t that what it’s really all about.

Scott said...

Since we're discussing a debate between LTC Gentile and proponents of FM 3-24, it might be worth looking at one of Gentile's earlier articles. This one, from an article "The Dogmas of War" stands out on Gentile's understanding.

There is, for example, the discussion of the 4th Infantry Divison’s (4ID) purported heavy-handed approach in places such as Tikrit that, as the narrative goes, in the early months of the war in 2003 enflamed rather than subdued the budding Sunni insurgency. There were alternatives to the 4ID’s approach that proponents of the narrative cite, and these were the methods employed by the 101st Airborne Division under then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus and Marines in the south of Iraq under then-Maj. Gen. James Mattis. Implicit in this narrative is that if units like the 4ID had operated as the Marines and 101st did, the virulent Sunni insurgency would not have developed.

Gentile goes on to assert that Tikrit under then-Maj. Gen. Ray Odierno was different from "the south of Iraq under then-Maj. Gen. James Mattis" and that we should not make a priori assumptions as to whether the differneces of locale or differences in methods effected the differences in results. Has anyone called Gentile out on his factual error here? Not that the south was different from Tikrit and thus could account for different results even without any effect of different methods, but of where then-MG Mattis served. In actuality, Mattis served in Tikrit at the start of the occupation and was followed by Odierno.

Mike said...

"Abu Muqawama -- who may be silly and ignorant but has read his Clausewitz -- sees FM 3-24 actually pushing the Army and Marine Corps closer to Clausewitz."

Agreed. You've got to remember that the thinking that the U.S. military calls "Clausewitzian" is actually closer to something coming from Jomini, as you allude to.

I've been racking my brain for a battle or campaign from a conventional war that was a tactical or even strategic victory but that did not help further the political aim. I wasn't able to come up with much (my first though was the Hurtgen Forest, but since that was a tactical and strategic defeat for the Allies it doesn't really apply) but I thought if we were able to find an example it might provide a useful reference point on the importance of politics for those who don't yet "get" unconventional warfare.

Any ideas?

Adrian said...

Mike - perhaps the Battle of New Orleans?

Mike said...

Hm. Perhaps...you'd have the problem of the fact that it was fought after the treaty was signed, making the question of political goals kind of irrelevant. (In fact, you could make the case that the battle, as it happened, secured no tactical, operational, or strategic goal but did serve a political one in convincing the British to abide by the treaty.)

However, if we set aside the treaty and look at it from a "what if the treaty wasn't signed" viewpoint, from the British side you could argue that the entire idea of a campaign from New Orleans wasn't really helping any political goal.

I suppose New Orleans would work, but something a bit more modern would really be nice.

P.S. - sorry for hijacking the comments, AM.

Fat Man said...

Lt.C. Gian Gentile "War ... at its essence, it is fighting, and fighting causes misery and death."

Another ancient authority who does not agree with the Gentile:

"Art of War" by Sun Tzu, Book 3. Attack by Stratagem:

Sun Tzu said: *** to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

* * *

Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

spoon said...

A similar debate was taken up nearly 20 years ago by Michael Shafer, author of Deadly Paradigms. This is one of the best books on COIN at the policy level. (Although that distinction may be by default since its rare to find anyone that discusses COIN at this level.)

Shafer's main points (and then some):
- The "how" of COIN cannot dominate the "what." (Just another way of saying tactical success guarantees nothing). Just striving to do COIN better (which is what the majority of the COIN literature focuses on) isn't worth much if you don't have a strategic understanding of the insurgency (because you may end up just making things worse - e.g. Promoting "security" (via guns, training, money to SK forces) for the South Vietnamese without realizing that atrocities from South Vietnamese security forces were actually feeding the insurgency)

- Security, progress and development (what Shafer calls The 3 Great Oughts of US COIN doctrine) are insufficient for victory if (1) we don't have adequate leverage over the host nation govt (HNG) (e.g. Vietnam, Greece, Philippines), (2) the HNG doesn't have the will or ability to make the changes we want them to (e.g. Philippines, Vietnam under Diem), or (3) we don't clearly understand HN government to populace relations (e.g. Vietnam)

- Lastly, Shafer claims that two COIN efforts typically considered victories - Greece and Philippines - were actually failures because our COIN policies didn't cause the successful outcomes (and may have made things worse). He sites external factors as driving success: 1)catastrophic mistakes by Greek insurgents (which sounds similar to the Anbar Awakening) and 2) the arrival of the Magsaysay savior in Philippines.)

Anyway, this short post doesn't nearly do justice to Shafer's points. It certainly should be on everyone's COIN reading list IMHO. To this day, I'm really surprised Shafer is entirely left out of the COIN debate (I'm trying to change that a bit by drafting an article on the relevanc of his ideas to today that I hope to float out to SWJ or some other outlet).

Sorry for the all this strategy-talk Abu muqawama.

Jeff Spoon

Anonymous said...

I don't think anybody says that you have to take the killing out of COIN, but the time has come to realize that killing more is not always better...

I may be off as I haven't read the articles yet, but it seems to me that this is almost an old guard vs reformist kinda arguement?

Anyways, thanks AM...love the blog!

Anonymous said...

I've almost finished Schafer's book...it's very theortical (IR type of theory) in the beginning...but he makes some great points and it does seem as Spoon said that he is left out of much discussion...

So much talk focuses on how to do COIN, but much ignores policy...

Is it in Afghan powerbrokers interests (at the local level) to work for improved government? Or does this actually undermine their power base...is security good for them? Maybe not as they are a player if they can "resolve" the fighting...

Just some thoughts...

Anonymous said...

While not suggesting the wholesale removal of that paragon of western military thinking, should Clausewitz remain our primary strategic totem? Might not Machiavelli help us chart a more appropriate course?

(and, yes, I am aware that we can draw from more than one historical figure at a time...pedants)

Abu Muqawama said...

In Abu Muqawama's very humble opinion, Books I, II, and VIII of Clausewitz's "On War" are required reading. I'm not sure I can say the same thing about Machiavelli's "On War."

Mike said...

Forget Machiavelli's "On War"...what about "The Prince"?

Fnord said...

Mike: "I've been racking my brain for a battle or campaign from a conventional war that was a tactical or even strategic victory but that did not help further the political aim."

For the closest example to the current situation, I think that Italys invasion of Albania and Greece can be seen as examples to paralel the Iraq invasion. If we accept that the primary target of the US post 9/11 was the fight against AQ, then the Iraq war can be seen to have drawn away the necessary US troop strength that was required to bag AQ in Waziristan in the window of opportunity that followed 9/11. (This is not intended to Hitlerize the discussion, btw). I would posit that in the aftermath of 9/11 and before Iraq, there would have been very little reaction inside Pakistan for deep incursions into Pashtunia. This window is now closed forever.

It still amazes me that the US military seems to have gone into Iraq almost blind, without any cultural prepping, without any Phase IV. I still have to see any detailed description of what exactly happened in the transition-phase between the original O-Plan (5000 US troop in Iraq round about now) and the decision to occupy indefinetly. It still smells like a set-up to me, intended to earn Haliburton et. al. shitloads of cash. Either that, or rank vile stupidity.

Charlie said...

Mike--I thought this posted yesterday, alas. But the Germans in both WWI and WWII are the paragons of tactical proficiency and strategic blindness (leading my old undergrads to quip "Germans don't do strategy.") Think WWI Spring Offensive: pull everyone off the front, retrain them, break Allied lines, and...then what? Helluva op; but it wasn't married to any strategy or policy.

And, closer to home on this blog, pretty much every battle victory in Vietnam was strategically irrelevant, what with us having either or or a miserable strategy (at least until Abrams arrived).

Anonymous said...

I would agree that C's version of On War is more useful than M's. I was, as Mike suggested, referring to The Prince.

It's a silly point really, true understanding is much deeper than one vs. the other, I guess I am tired of hearing the war is politics by other means point made over and over. Great point for maneuver warfare between nation states and still relevant, to an extent today, but there is more subtlety required in our thinking.

fnord said...

Clausewits said something like: Defensive positions in hostile territories are useless without any supporting forward momentum. This pretty much sums up the Iraq trap that derailed the whole GWOT. I still dont understand how it all happened, that the war against AQ merged into the war against Saddam. Work for historians these next hundred years.

But I would dearly like to see Paul Bremer testify on financial matters during his tenure as emir of Iraq. Those Hercules-flights with dollarbills...